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INTRODUCTION
On July 25, 1995, an international war crimes tribunal
handed down indictments against the Bosnian Serb leader, Dr.
Radovan Karad~i, and his top military commander, General
Ratko Mladic. a With this indictment, the international commu-
nity took another step in a process that began when the United
Nations ("U.N.") Security Council created the International Tri-
bunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vi-
olations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia ("Tribunal") in 1991.2
Since its creation, the Tribunal's jurisdiction and the sub-
stantive crimes it will likely consider have generated considera-
ble academic interest.3 The Tribunal's rules of procedure and
1. Marlise Simons, Conflict in the Balkans: War Crimes; U.N. Tribunal Indicts Bosnian
Serb Leader and a Commander; N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at A9. Dr. KaradiM and General
Mladic were indicted along with 22 other individuals and were charged with genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Id. The Tribunal handed down its first in-
dictment on November 7, 1994, against Dragan Nikolic, a former concentration camp
commander. Roger Cohen, Serb is First to Face Post-World War II War-Crimes Indictment,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 8, 1994, at A5. The Tribunal has now indicted 52 individuals. Fifty-
one of those indicted, including Dr. Karadi and General Mladic remain at large.
Chris Hedges, War Crimes Tribunal Indicts 6 Brosnian Croats, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1995, at
A3. Only one, Dusan Tadic, has been extradited to the seat of the tribunal at The
Hague, where he is currently awaiting trial. Id.
2. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808
(1993) (deciding that international tribunal should be established and directing Secre-
tary-General to prepare proposal in this regard for Security Council consideration);
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993),
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203, 1204. Security Council Resolution 827 created the Tribunal
by adopting the Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163 [hereinaf-
ter Report On Establishing the Tribunal]. The annex to the Report On Establishing the Tribu-
nal contains the Statute of the International Tribunal. Report on Establishing the Tribu-
nal, supra, Annex at 36, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1192 [hereinafter Tribunal
Statute].
3. See generally, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA
WOMEN's L.J. 59 (1993); Theodore Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanita-
rian Law, 87 AM.J. INT'L L. 424 (1993) [hereinafter Rape as a Crime]; Theodore Meron,
War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the Development of International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 78
(1994) [hereinafter War Crimes Law]; James C. O'Brien, The International Tribunal for
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evidence,4 however, have not received the same scrutiny,5 paral-
leling the academic treatment of the Nuremberg trials.' The
practical application of the Tribunal's procedural and eviden-
tiary rules compels analysis and deserves comment. As trials ap-
proach, we owe it to the international community, to the victims
of war crimes, and to those who may stand accused before such
tribunals ("the accused") to thoroughly analyze the Tribunal's
procedural and evidentiary rules.
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
639 (1994); Elizabeth A. Pearl, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of Yugosla-
via Provide an End to Victor's Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1373 (1993); Kathleen M. Pratt
& Laurel E. Fletcher, Time for Justice: The Case for International Prosecutions of Rape and
Gender-based Violence in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 BERKLEY WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (1994); Edward
D. Re, Judicial Enforcement of International Human Rights, 27 AKRON L. REa. 281 (1994);
Paul C. Szasz, The Proposed War Crimes Tribunal for Ex-Yugoslavia, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 405 (1993); Tamara L. Tompkins, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the
Unspeakable, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 845 (1995); Daniel B. Pickard, Comment, Security
Council Resolution 808: A Step Toward a Permanent International Court for the Prosecution of
International Crimes and Human Rights Violations, 25 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 435 (1995);
Mark A. Bland, Note, An Analysis of the United Nations International Tribunal to Adjudicate
War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia: Parallels, Problems, Prospects, 2 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 233 (1994); David M. Kresock, Note, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the
Balkans: The Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention, 27 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 203 (1994);
Jordan J. Paust, Recent Development, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to Events
in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 499 (1994); Keith E. Puls, Book
Review, 12 B.U. INT'L L. J. 139 (1994) (reviewing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT
ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE FOR-
MER YUGOSLAVIA). See Symposium, War Crimes: Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA.J. INT'L L. 255
(1994); A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM L.F.
223 (1995) (providing symposia discussions of Tribunal).
4. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the For-
mer Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994),
amended by U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.1 (1994), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.2 (1994), U.N. Doc.
IT/32/Rev.3 (1995); 33 I.L.M. 484 [hereinafter I.T.R.P.E.].
5. But see Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM L.F. 507 (1995).
6. The American Bar Association has commented on the lack of scholarly analysis
of the procedural rules used at the Nuremberg trials and the need for such analysis of
the Tribunal's rules:
Particularly when compared to the analysis of substantive law applied by the
[International Military Tribunal], discussion of the criminal procedures used
at Nuremberg has been scant.... The lack of scholarly analysis of the Nurem-
berg procedures is unfortunate. Procedural issues at the Tribunal are likely to
be complicated and difficult, and a more complete scholarly analysis of the
Nuremberg procedures would have been helpful.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE
WAR CRIMES COMMITrED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 8 (1993) (citations omit-
ted) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
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Such analysis is important for two reasons. First, the estab-
lishment of the Tribunal is of precedential importance in what is
likely to be an era marked by increased international coopera-
tion 7 and humanitarian intervention.8 In this regard, the Tribu-
nal and its rules will serve as precedent not only for other ad hoc
tribunals,9 but also for a permanent international criminal court
patterned after the International Court of Justice. 10 Thus, the
Tribunal should ensure its rules are models of fairness and due
process. Second, although concurrent with the jurisdiction of
7. The likelihood of such tribunals may increase due to the collapse of interna-
tional communism resulting in a commensurate increase in international cooperation
and the fracturing of many countries resulting in a commensurate increase in "interna-
tional" conflicts.
8. International consensus increasingly views humanitarian intervention as a legiti-
mate purpose for the use of force. Historically, concepts of self-defense or collective
self-defense justified use of force. The use of force to intervene in the internal domestic
affairs of another state, however, has not generally been viewed as legitimate. See U.N.
CHARTER arts. 2, 7, 51. There is, however, the evolving concept that the use of force
may be justified on the grounds of "humanitarian intervention." See generally Lois E.
Fieldink, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right
of Humanitarian Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DuKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 329 (1995).
The U.N. intervention in Somalia provides an example of humanitarian interven-
tion. During 1992 and 1993, the images of starving Somali children prompted U.N.
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in an internal situation.
S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/837 (1993). A
further example is provided by the U.N. intervention in Haiti in 1994. S.C. Res. 940,
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994).
The reliance on humanitarian intervention to justify intervention in the internal
affairs of another state heralds a "revolutionary change in our conception of the author-
ity of the United Nations to enforce peace in such situations." Rape as a Crime, supra
note 3, at 424.
9. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (establishing ad hoc international tribunal
to prosecute genocide in Rwanda); John D. McKinnon, Traveling Human Rights Lawyer,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1994, at 40 (discussing tribunal established to prosecute human rights
violations in Ethiopia).
10. In 1950, the United Nations International Law Commission ("ILC") first pro-
posed a permanent international criminal court. Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Question of CriminalJurisdiction U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/15 (1950). For the next 45
years, the proposal languished because states could not come to a consensus as to the
governing law, nor would states willingly cede a portion of their sovereignty. See gener-
ally M. Cherif Bassiouni & Christopher L. Blakesley, The Need for an International Crimi-
nal Court in the New International World Order, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 151 (1992); M.
Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an International Criminal Court, 1 IND. Irr'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 1 (1991). The success of the international community in creating the
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has sparked renewed interest in a permanent inter-
national criminal court. The ILC recently completed a draft statute for a permanent
tribunal and a draft code of crimes. See generally James Crawford, The ILC's Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Tribunal, 88 AM. J. INr'L L. 140 (1994).
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national courts, the Security Council resolution creating the Tri-
bunal gives it primary jurisdiction over all war crimes committed
within the territory of the former Yugoslavia including, at least
theoretically, those committed by U.N. and U.S. forces.11
This jurisdictional issue becomes increasingly important as
the United States and other nations prepare to deploy troops in
Bosnia to act as peacekeepers. 2 Absent the primary jurisdiction
of the Tribunal, the military would prosecute U.S. service mem-
bers and foreign nationals in U.S. custody accused of violating
international humanitarian law under the U.S. Uniform Code of
Military Justice ("UCMJ"). 1 Although commentators and jurists
have often scrutinized and criticized the military justice system,14
11. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 9, 18, 32-33, 69; Tribunal
Statute, supra, note 2, art. 1, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 36, 32 I.L.M. at 1192.
12. Elaine Scioleno, All Sides Make Concessions to End 4 Years of Conflict, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 22, 1995, at Al.
13. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Article 2 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice ("UCMJ") confers courts-martial jurisdiction over various categories of
U.S. service members. 10 U.S.C. § 802. Article 18 of the UCMJ authorizes the armed
forces to try by general courts-martial anyone subject to trial for violations of the law of
war. 10 U.S.C. § 818. Alternatively, Article 21 of the UCMJ authorizes the use of mili-
tary commissions, tribunals, or provost courts to try individuals for war crimes viola-
tions. Id. If general courts-martial tried the accused, the rules of evidence and proce-
dure contained in the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES would govern the
proceedings. If a military commission, tribunal, or provost court tried the accused, the
President is required to establish rules of evidence and procedure. 10 U.S.C. § 836.
Absent action by the President to set such rules, military commissions, tribunals, and
provost courts are required to be guided by the principles of law and rules of procedure
and evidence prescribed for courts-martial. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATES, pmbl., 2(b)(2) (1994). Thus, absent the international tribunal, military per-
sonnel and foreign nationals in U.S. custody would enjoy the protection of the UCMJ.
See generally Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums for Punishing Offenses
Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REa. 509 (1994).
Certainly, the United States could require waiver of primaryjurisdiction as a condi-
tion precedent to committing troops to the conflict. Such a "waiver back" provision is
common to stationing agreements between the U.S. Government and host nations. See,
e.g., Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement with Respect
to the Forces Stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany, Aug. 3, 1959, art. 19, TIAS
No. 5351, 14 U.S.T. 531, 552; Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea, Regarding
Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of
Korea, July 9, 1966, art. XXII, 3(c), TIAS No. 6127, 17 U.S.T. 1677, 1695. Requiring a
waiver of primary jurisdiction, however, risks calling into question the legitimacy of the
Tribunal and the fairness of its rules and procedures.
14. See generally Michael I. Spak, Military Justice: The Oxymoron of the 1980's, 20 CAL.
W. L. REv. 436, 438 (1984); ROBERT SHERRIL, MILITARY MUSIC IS TOJUSTICE AS MILITARY
MUSIC IS TO MUSIC (1970). See also O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) ("A
court-martial is not yet an independent instrument of justice but remains to a signifi-
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the rules of the Tribunal have not received similar scrutiny to
determine whether they adequately protect individual rights.
The Tribunal's rules are no less important, should receive simi-
lar scrutiny and, insofar as the rules are found to be less protec-
tive of the accused than the UCMJ, criticism. For those who view
Anglo-American notions of due process and substantive rights as
the ultimate standards by which any criminal justice system is
measured, the fundamental question should be whether such
persons would allow themselves to be tried by such a tribunal.
This Article compares the protections and rights provided
an accused before the Tribunal with those protections and rights
provided an accused before U.S. courts-martial.1 5 Part I provides
an overview of the statute creating the Tribunal and identifies
cant degree a specialized part of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is
preserved.... [C]ourts-martial as an institution are singularly inept in dealing with the
nice subtleties of constitutional law."); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)
("[M]ilitary tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such a
way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution has deemed
essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts.").
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressed confidence in the military
justice system in a series of decisions. See United States v. Solorio, 483 U.S. 435, 450-51
(1987) (granting military universal jurisdiction over offenses committed by service
members); Weiss v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 752, 762 (1994) ("[T]he applicable provi-
sions of the UCMJ, and corresponding regulations, by insulating militaryjudges from
the effects of command influence, sufficiently preserve judicial impartiality so as to sat-
isfy the Due Process Clause."); Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2354 (1994)
(using militaryjustice system case to resolve split within Circuit Courts of Appeals). The
military justice system is not without its defenders. For a favorable comparison of the
military justice system to the U.S. civilian justice system, see Francis A. Gilligan &
Michael D. Wims, Civilian Justice v. Military Justice, CIuM. JusT., Summer 1990, at 2.
15. Although the military justice system provides for three different types of courts-
martial (general, special, and summary), for the purposes of this Article, "court-martial"
refers to general court-martial. Depending on the severity of the offense, authorized
general court-martial punishments include: punitive censure, punitive separation from
the service such as bad conduct or dishonorable discharge, confinement for life, and
death. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States 1003 (1995 ed.), Rules for Court Mar-
tial [hereinafter R.C.M.]. A special court-martial is similar to a general court-martial
except for the maximum punishment. In a special court-martial, authorized punish-
ments include: confinement for six months, reduction to the grade of private, forfeit-
ures totaling not more than two-thirds pay per month for six months, and a bad con-
duct discharge. R.C.M. 201 (f) (2) (B). A summary court-martial provides a simple pro-
cedure for adjudicating relatively minor offenses. R.C.M. 1301 (b). In a summary court-
martial, the maximum punishment that may be adjudged is relatively minor. Punish-
ments include: confinement for 30 days, reduction to the grade of private, and forfei-
ture of two-thirds pay per month for one month. R.C.M. 1301(d). The relatively low
maximum punishments given in special and summary courts-martial make them highly
unlikely forums for a war crime allegation.
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the general principles the statute appears to advance. Part II
analyzes the Tribunal's procedural and evidentiary rules, com-
pares these rules to the analogous military rules, and discusses
how well the Tribunal rules comport with the general principles
advanced by the statute. This Article concludes that the Tribu-
nal rules, although fundamentally sound, are not as protective of
the individual rights of the accused as the military justice system
and recommends modifications of the Tribunal rules to remedy
the noted deficiencies.
I. THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
A. Background
Daily newscasts reveal that widespread atrocities were com-
mitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia for much of the
post four years.16 These crimes include ethnically motivated kill-
ings, genocide, massacres, torture, systematic rape, the expulsion
of thousands from their traditional homes, and the targeting of
civilians.' 7 The most notable atrocities involve the practice of
ethnic cleansing.18
By February 1993, events persuaded the U.N. Security Coun-
cil to declare that these atrocities constituted "a threat to inter-
16. See, e.g., John Pomfret, Atrocities Leave Thirst for Vengence in Balkings, WASH.
POST, Dec. 18, 1995, at Al (describing atrocities in war torn territory).
17. See, e.g., Steve Coil, In the Shadow of the Holocaust, WASH. POST MAG., Sept. 25,
1994, at 8 (describing acts of torture in wartime detention camps).
18. Letter Dated 24 May 1994 From the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council, at 33, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994) (containing the Final Report of the
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780, U.N. Doc. S/
1994/674 Add. 2, Vol. 1-5 (1992)) [hereinafter Final Report]. Ethnic cleansing has been
defined as "rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation
to remove persons of given groups from the area." Id. Professor Theodore Meron
provides the following description of the practice of ethnic cleansing and its relation-
ship to international human rights law:
Ethnic cleansing consists of harassment, discrimination, beatings, torture,
summary executions, expulsions, forced crossing of the lines between combat-
ants, intimidation, destruction of secular and religious property, mass and sys-
tematic rape, arbitrary arrests and executions, deliberate military attacks on
civilians and civilian property, uses of siege and cutting off essential supplies
destined for civilian populations. Many of these methods, considered in isola-
tion constitute a war crime or a grave breach, Considered as a cluster of viola-
tions, these practices constitute crimes against humanity and perhaps also
crimes under the Genocide Convention.
Theodore Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1994, at 122, 132 [hereinafter War Crimes Trials].
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national peace," and that the creation of an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal would "contribute to the restoration of
peace."1 9 Accordingly, the Security Council requested the Secre-
tary-General to prepare a report detailing all aspects of imple-
menting its decision to create a tribunal.2 ° On May 8, 1993, the
Secretary-General completed his report and presented it to the
Security Council with a proposed statute for an international tri-
bunal. On May 25, 1993, the Security Council established the
Tribunal by unanimously adopting the proposed statute.
The Tribunal is the first international war crimes tribunal
since those established to judge German and Japanese leaders at
the end of World War 1J.23 Like the Tokyo and Nuremberg tri-
als, the Tribunal will hold accuseds individually responsible for
the charges against them,2 4 and accuseds will not be able to ar-
gue that they acted under Orders2 5 or that subordinates actually
19. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 2. These two findings are necessary prerequisites to
U.N. action. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 41, 42. These findings, in the context of violations,
of humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, are of precedential importance:
The singling out of violations of humanitarian law as a major factor in the
determination of a threat to the peace creates an important precedent, and
the establishment of the tribunal as an enforcement measure under the bind-
ing authority of chapter VII, rather than through a treaty creating an interna-
tional criminal court whose jurisdiction would be subject to the consent of the
states concerned, may foreshadow more effective international responses to
violations of humanitarian law.
War Crimes Law, supra note 3, at 79.
20. S.C. Res. 808, supra note 2.
21. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 3, 1-3.
22. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 2.
23. See generally Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War
Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S.
280 (setting forth "London Charter" establishing "International Military Tribunal" or
Nuremberg Tribunal to try Nazi war criminals); Charter of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, amended Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4
Bevans 20 [hereinafter International Tribunal]. But see generally AGAINST THE CRIME OF
SILENCE (PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELL INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL) (. Duf-
fett ed., 1968) (chronicling case in which United States was found guilty of war crimes
committed during Vietnam War); RAMSEY CLARK, THE FIRE THIS TIME: U.S. WAR CRIMES
IN THE GULF (1992) (detailing war crimes allegedly committed by United States during
Persian Gulf War and "international" tribunal which found United States guilty of these
alleged crimes).
24. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 14-15, 1 53-59; Tribunal
Statute, supra note 2, art. 7, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 38-39, 32 I.L.M. at 1193-94.
25. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 15, 57; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 2, art. 7, 1 4, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 38-39, 32 I.L.M. at 1193-94.
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carried out the alleged crimes.2 6
Unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, however, the Tri-
bunal is unlikely to have the support of the governments in con-
trol of the territory where the crimes were committed or their
assistance in delivering to the proper authorities those indicted
by the Tribunal. This lack of support preempts the criticism
aimed at the Nuremberg and Tokyo courts; that they were essen-
tially victors' courts imposing victors' justice. This same lack of
support, however, will make evidence gathering2 7 and detention
of suspects difficult. Moreover, the world community may lose
interest in an international tribunal, looking instead to the lead-
ers of the warring factions to provide leadership and stability in
this volatile region.28
Despite these potential difficulties and the international
community's initial skepticism, the Tribunal has made tremen-
dous progress in the two years since its creation: judges have
been selected; the Tribunal has adopted its rules of procedure
and evidence; a prosecutor has been selected and has formed a
prosecutorial team; construction has begun on a detention facil-
ity; indictments have been confirmed; and one suspect is in cus-
tody.2 9 Trials appear imminent.
Before discussing the evidentiary and procedural rules and
comparing them with analogous military rules it is important to
identify and discuss the principles sought to be advanced by the
United Nations in creating the Tribunal. Review of the Tribu-
26. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 15, 1 56; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 2, art. 7, 1 3, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 39, 32 I.L.M. 1194.
27. Some commentators have indicated that evidence gathering may prove diffi-
cult due to the absence of a vast "paper-trail," similar to the one left by the Germans.
War Crimes Trials, supra note 18, at 133. This difficulty is more than offset, however, by
the investigative and evidence gathering efforts of the U.N. Commission of Experts and
other organizations. See generally Final Report, supra note 18 (documenting efforts to
investigate human rights violations in former Yugoslavia); M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Com-
mission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780: Investigating Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 5 Cram. L. F. 279 (1994).
28. Although the peace accord entered into on November 21, 1995 prohibits those
indicted from running for political office, the accord is silent regarding any require-
ment to cooperate with the Tribunal or deliver those indicted to the Tribunal for trial.
Sciolino, supra note 12, at Al. It is too early to judge whether the United States Military
or other peacekeeping forces will attempt to take into custody those indicted by the
Tribunal.
29. See generally Barbara Franklin, A Tribunal Waiting for Wor*, A.BA J.,June 1995,
at 30; Coil, supra note 17; Barbara Franklin, Bosnia: The New Nuremberg, NAT'L L.J., Sept.
26, 1994, at 1.
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nal's statute-its charter-reveals three overriding principles:
(1) a commitment to prosecuting only violations of well estab-
lished customary international law; (2) a commitment to ensur-
ing fair trials for those accused; and (3) a commitment to pro-
tecting victims and witnesses.
B. Substantive Law
The U.N. Security Council established the Tribunal to try
those responsible for the lengthy list of atrocities committed by
the participants in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.1a The
subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal, however, is limited to
"serious violations of international humanitarian law."3 ' The
statute identifies four categories of crimes within this jurisdic-
tion: grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions;3" violations of
the laws or customs of war;3 3 genocide;34 and crimes against hu-
manity.3 5
In limiting the Tribunal's jurisdiction to these categories of
crimes, the Security Council applied the principle of nullum cri-
men sine lege - no crime without law.36 The Secretary-General
stressed adherence to this principle, stating that the Tribunal
would not be creating new law, but would have the task of apply-
ing existing international humanitarian law. 7 Thus, it appears
that only these general categories of crimes that are "beyond
doubt... part of international customary law... applicable in
armed conflict,138 and specific acts that fall within the accepted
definitions of these crimes, fall within the Tribunal's subject mat-
30. Final Report, supra note 18, 127.
31. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 9, 1 33.
32. Tribunal Statute, supra note 2, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 36, 32 1.L.M. at
1192.
33. Id. art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 37, 32 I.L.M. at 1192.
34. Id. art. 4, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 37-38, 32 I.L.M. at 1192-93.
35. Id. art. 5, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 38, 32 I.L.M. at 1193-94.
36. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 9, 34.
37. Id. at 8, 1 29. The Report On Establishing the Tribunal states:
[I]n assigning to the International Tribunal the task of prosecuting persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Secur-
ity Council would not be creating or purporting to "legislate" that law. Rather,
the International Tribunal would have the task of applying existing interna-
tional humanitarian law.
Id. This will also avoid the difficulty presented by the "adherence of some but not all
States to specific conventions." Id. at 9, 34.
38. Id. at 9, 35.
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ter jurisdiction. Other violations of international humanitarian
law, as well as ordinary crimes, do not fall within the Tribunal's
jurisdiction and remain punishable only by national courts.
C. Fair Trials and Fundamental Rights
The ultimate success of the Tribunal will not be measured
by its volume of prosecutions, but by the perception of the Tri-
bunal within the international community. A positive percep-
tion of the conduct of trials will add immeasurably to the legiti-
macy of the Tribunal and may create precedent for a permanent
tribunal established to deal with violations of international hu-
manitarian law. The Tribunal's statute requires it to ensure that
trials are "fair and expeditious and that proceedings are con-
ducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence
and with full respect for the rights of the accused."39 In addition
to this broad mandate, the statute enumerates the specific rights
of the accused. In enumerating these rights, the Secretary-Gen-
eral indicated that "the International Tribunal must fully respect
internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the
accused at all stages of its proceedings."40 In his view, these in-
ternationally recognized standards are codified in Article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.41
These rights include the right to a fair and public hearing, the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges, the
right to adequate time and resources to prepare a defense, the
right to be tried without undue delay, the right to counsel, the
right to examine (or have examined) witnesses, and the right
against self-incrimination."
In addition to these individual rights, the statute provides
for a presumption of innocence.43 Although the statute implic-
itly allocated this burden to the prosecution by indicating the
presumption continues until the accused is proved guilty, 4 it did
not provide for a standard by which the prosecutor overcomes
39. Id. at 25, 99.
40. Id. at 27, 106.
41. Id. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6 (Cmnd. 6702).
42. Tribunal Statute, supra note 2, art. 21, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 44, 32 I.L.M. at
1198.
43. Id. art. 21, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 44-45, 32 I.L.M. at 1198-99.
44. Id.
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the presumption. 45 Commentators criticized the failure to estab-
lish such a standard and urged that the Tribunal require proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to overcome this presumption.46
Eventually, the Tribunal adopted this standard in its procedural
and evidentiary rules.47 Taken together, the presumption of in-
nocence and the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a rea-
sonable doubt will ensure that the accused receives a fundamen-
tally fair trial. If the Tribunal adopted any lesser standard, it
would call the validity of any convictions into question and cloud
the process.
Finally, the Tribunal's statute provides that accuseds have
the right to be present and participate in their own defense-
trials in absentia are prohibited." This conforms to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which requires the
accused's presence.49 Absent total victory by the Bosnian Gov-
ernment, the Tribunal will probably not receive assistance from
the authorities that control the territory where many of the
crimes were committed.50 Accordingly, some countries pro-
posed conducting the trials in absentia.5' Although the Nurem-
berg Charter permitted trials in absentia," such trials would be
inherently vulnerable to abuse and would violate basic norms of
due process.53 Therefore, the Security Council prohibited them.
45. This is consistent with the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials where there was no
expressed standard of proof. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, art. 26, 59 Stat. 1546, 1552, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 300 [hereinafter Nuremberg Char-
ter]; International Tribunal, supra note 23, art. 17, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, at 11, 4 Bevans at
32.
46. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 26-29.
47. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 87(A), at 36.
48. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 27, 101.
49. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 41, art.
14(3)(d), 999 U.N.T.S. at 171, 1977 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 6 at 27.
50. War Crimes Trials, supra note 18, at 133. Even given lasting peace or total vic-
tory by one side or the other, it is likely the victorious government would resist efforts to
prosecute alleged war-criminals within its own ranks.
51. See, e.g., Peter Burns, An International Criminal Tribunal. The Difficult Union of
Principle and Politics, 5 CRiM. L. F. 341, 370 (1995).
52. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 45, art. 12, 59 STAT. at 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. at
290.
53. War Crimes Trials, supra note 18, at 125. As an alternative to trials in absentia,
the United Nations could require delivery of suspects as a condition precedent to nor-
malizing relations with the victor. Id. at 134. This could prove difficult, however, when
the one sought is the one being negotiated with by the United Nations. Anthony
D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 AM. J. INrr'L L. 500, 500 (1994).
[S]ome of the Serbian, Muslim, and Croatian political and military leaders
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D. Victim and Witness Protection
Due to the nature of some of the crimes involved, particu-
larly rape, the Security Council required the Tribunal to provide
for victim and witness protection in its rules of procedure and
evidence, including provision for in camera proceedings and the
protection of victim identity.5 4 The placement of this rule within
the Tribunal's statute, immediately after the article governing
the rights of the accused, recognizes that the rules must balance
victim and witness protection with the rights of the accused, par-
ticularly ,the right to examine witnesses.
Thus, the Tribunal's statute appears to advance three gen-
eral principles: (1) the Tribunal should only prosecute those
crimes that are beyond doubt part of customary international
law; (2) the accused should receive a fair trial with certain funda-
mental rights guaranteed; and (3) the Tribunal should protect
victims and witnesses.5 If a conflict arises between these princi-
ples, the first principle should control over the other two, and
the second principle should control over the third. The basis of
this assertion is that the first principle relates to subject matter
jurisdiction. Absent such jurisdiction, the accused would not be
before the Tribunal and there would be no trial. Once properly
before the Tribunal, the right to a fair trial is fundamental. The
protection of victims and witnesses, although a laudable goal,
must yield to the right to a fair trial when the tvo conflict. The
Tribunal's rules of procedure and evidence should reflect these
three principles and balance one against the other when neces-
sary.
II. RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
Despite the great detail of the resolution creating the Tribu-
who are potential targets of the tribunal are participating in the peace negotia-
tions. Is it realistic to expect them to agree to a peace settlement in Bosnia if,
directly following the agreement, they may find themselves in the dock?
Id.
54. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 28, 1 108.
55. Beyond the provisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction, the rights of the
accused, and victim and wimess protection, the remainder of the statute details "the
organization of the [I]nternational [T]ribunal, the investigation and pre-trial proceed-
ings, trial and post-trial proceedings, and cooperation and judicial assistance... and a
number of general and organizational issues." Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra
note 2, at 6, 16.
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nal, the Security Council delegated certain responsibilities to the
Tribunal including the responsibility to formulate "rules of pro-
cedure and evidence . . .governing the pre-trial phase of the
proceedings, the conduct of trials and appeals, the admission of
evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other ap-
propriate matters.""
On May 28, 1993, the U.S. Government formed a working
group composed of criminal and international lawyers to pre-
pare proposed evidentiary and procedural rules for the Tribu-
nal. The objective of the group was to create fair judicial
processes-fair to the degree that would be acceptable for the
prosecution of its own citizens. On November 18, 1993, the U.S.
Government submitted proposed rules to the Tribunal through
the American jurist serving on the Tribunal." On February 11,
1994, the Tribunal adopted rules5" that relied heavily on the pro-
posal submitted by the U.S. Government.59
A. Pretrial Procedure
In general, the Tribunal's statute and rules provide for six
procedural steps in the pretrial stage. First, the prosecutor has
unlimited discretion to initiate an investigation.6" During the in-
vestigative stage, the prosecutor has the power to "summon and
question suspects, victims and witnesses .... collect evidence
and conduct on-site investigations."6 ' The prosecutor also has
the broad power to take measures necessary to complete an in-
vestigation and to conduct a prosecution.6" Second, if the prose-
cutor determines that a prima facie case exists, the prosecutor
56. Id. at 21, 1 83; Tribunal Statute, supra note 2, art. 15, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 42,
32 I.L.M. at 1196.
57. Letter from James P. Terry, Legal Counsel to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff, to Michael C. Wholley, StaffJudge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine
Corps (Nov. 19, 1993) (on file with Fordham International Law Journal). The American
jurist serving on the Tribunal is Professor Gabriel Kirk McDonald of the University of
Houston Law School.
58. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4.
59. Nsereko, supra note 5, at 508.
60. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 24-25, 1 98; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 2, art. 18, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 43, 32 I.L.M. at 1197-98.
61. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 39(i), at 18.
62. Id. 39(ii), at 18. The prosecutor has the power to "undertake such other meas-
ures as may appear necessary for completing the investigation ... and conduct of the
prosecution." Id.
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prepares an indictment.6" Third, the prosecutor transmits the
indictment to a designated trial chamberjudge. Fourth, the des-
ignated trial chamberjudge confirms the indictment if he or she
agrees that it presents a prima facie case. Otherwise, the judge
dismisses the indictment.' Fifth, if the indictment is confirmed,
the judge issues an arrest warrant for the accused if the accused
is not already in the Tribunal's custody.65 After the accused's
arrest and transfer to the control of the Tribunal, the accused is
brought before a trial chamber judge for an arraignment pro-
ceeding and a date for trial is established.66 During the pretrial
stage, various issues arise concerning the right against self-in-
crimination, the right to counsel, the indictment and indict-
ment-confirmation process, pretrial detention, speedy trial, and
discovery.
1. The Right Against Self-Incrimination
The Tribunal's statute provides that the accused has the
right "not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess
guilt."67 The Tribunal enacted two procedural rules implement-
ing this provision. In Rule 55, the Tribunal requires that arrest
warrants issued by the Tribunal contain a statement of rights of
the accused6" including "the right to remain silent, and to be
cautioned that any statement [made] shall be recorded and used
in evidence."69 Rule 63 provides that:
After initial appearance of the accused the prosecutor shall
not question him unless his counsel is present.... The prose-
cutor shall at the beginning of the questioning caution the
accused that he is not obliged to say anything unless he
wishes to do so but that whatever he says may be given in
63. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 24-25, 98. The Tribunal
rules replace the phrase "prima facie case" with the phrase "sufficient evidence to pro-
vide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed a crime."
I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 47(A), at 21.
64. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 24-25, 98; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 2, art. 19, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 43, 32 I.L.M. at 1198.
65. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R.R. 54-61, at 23-26.
66. Id. R. 62, at 26.
67. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 27, 1 107; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 4, art. 2 1.4(g), U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 45, 32 I.L.M. at 1199.
68. The Tribunal rules define "accused" as "[a] person against whom an indict-
ment has been submitted" to the designated trial chamber judge for confirmation.
I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 2(A), at 4.
69. Id. R. 55(A), at 24.
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evidence.7°
Under these rules, the right to remain silent, and the re-
quirement that the accused be advised of this right, appear to
attach, at the earliest, when an individual is the subject of an
arrest warrant. Practically speaking, however, the accused will
not be informed of this right until the'arrest warrant is executed
and the accused is arrested. The accused would again be ad-
vised of this right during questioning by the prosecutor after the
initial appearance of the accused. The initial appearance of the
accused occurs when the accused is "brought before a [t]rial
[c]hamber" of the Tribunal to be formally charged after the in-
dividual has been indicted and arrested. 71 These rules parallel
the protections of Miranda v. Arizona,72 which requires a law en-
forcement officer to warn an individual of his or her rights
under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution before sub-
jecting him or her to custodial interrogations. 7
Under the Tribunal rules, an individual suspected of a
crime who is not yet in custody is also warned of his or her right
to remain silent. Under Rule 42, which details the rights of a
"suspect who is to be questioned by the [p]rosecutor," the prose-
cutor is required to inform suspects74 of "the right to remain
silent" and "to caution them that any statement [made] shall be
recorded and may be used in evidence." 75
These provisions parallel military law, and like military law,
are more protective of the individual's right to remain silent
than provisions extant in civilian practice. Under Article 31 (b)
of the UCMJ, persons subject to the UCMJ who wish to question
70. Id. R. 63, at 27.
71. Id. R. 62, at 26.
72. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
73. Id. at 444. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination only ap-
plies to "custodial interrogations." Id. The prosecution may not use statements stem-
ming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
"taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way" absent appropriate rights advisement. Id. Miranda applies to the military. United
States v. Tempia, 37 C.M.R. 249 (C.M.A. 1967).
74. The Tribunal rules define "suspect" as "[a] person concerning whom the Pros-
ecutor possesses reliable information which tends to show that he may have committed
a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction." I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, 2(A), at 4.
75. Id. R. 42(A) (iii), at 19. Originally, this rule was silent as to the requirement
that a suspect be cautioned that any statement made may be used as evidence. As such,
the rules could have been read to only provide for a right to remain silent during custo-
dial interrogation.
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a suspect are required to inform that individual of the nature of
the accusation and to warn the individual that his or her re-
sponse may be used at trial.76 Article 31 (b) applies whenever an
individual questions a suspect or an accused in an official capac-
ity, even if the questioning is noncustodial.77 Thus, the rights
warning requirement provided for in Article 31(b), which ap-
plies to any official questioning of a suspect, is broader than the
Fifth Amendment requirement for warnings, which applies only
to custodial interrogation. Two related issues, however, remain
unanswered.
First, the Tribunal's rules do not indicate whether the re-
quirement for the prosecutor to advise the suspect or the ac-
cused of these rights prior to questioning extends to others act-
ing on behalf of the prosecutor. The UCMJ states under Article
31 (b) that "[n] o person subject to this chapter" may question an
accused or a suspect without first providing these rights warn-
ings. The military courts have held that Congress did not intend
that the courts apply this language restrictively. 78 The U.S. Presi-
dent, moreover, in promulgating the Military Rules of Evi-
dence,79 specifically extended the rights warning requirement to
76. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Article 31 provides, in pertinent part,
that:
No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any statement
from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing
him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to
make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected
and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a
trial by court-martial.
Id. § 831(b).
77. In United States v. Duga, 10 M.J. 206, 210 (C.MA 1981), the Court of Military
Appeals ruled that questioning is official when: (1) a questioner subject to the UCMJ
conducts an inquiry in an official capacity, rather than through personal motivation;
and (2) the person questioned perceives the inquiry to be more than a casual conversa-
tion. In United States v. Loukas, the court further defined the first part of the Duga
"officiality plus perception" test - requiring rights warnings only when "questioning is
done during official law-enforcement investigation or disciplinary inquiry." 29 MJ. 385,
387 (C.M.A. 1990).
78. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES (1995), Military Rules of Evi-
dence [hereinafter MIL. R EviD.], MIL. R. EVID 305(b) (1) analysis; accord United States
v. Gibson, 14 C.M.R. 164, 170 (C.MA 1954).
79. Article 36, UCMJ, grants authority to the U.S. President to "prescribe rules"
governing trial procedures including "modes of proof." 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). Pursuant to this authority, the U.S. President promulgated evidentiary rules
contained in the Manual for Courts-Martial. These rules apply at all courts-martial.
MIL. R. EVID. 101(a).
492 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:475
civilians acting as knowing agents of military law enforcement
authorities.80
Because international law is undeveloped in this area, the
Tribunal itself must fill the vacuum. The Tribunal, like the mili-
tary, should extend the rights warning requirement to agents of
the prosecutor. This will ensure that the intent of the rule is not
circumvented and that accuseds are not prejudiced by the use of
investigative agents who are not assigned to the prosecutor's of-
fice, but who act as agents of the prosecutor.
Second, the Tribunal's rules do not provide a standard to
determine whether an individual has become a suspect, necessi-
tating rights warnings. Under military law, the test to determine
if a person is a suspect is whether, considering all facts and cir-
cumstances at the time of the interview, the government interro-
gator believed or reasonably should have believed that the indi-
vidual being interrogated committed an offense."1 The Tribu-
nal should develop a similar objective standard for measuring
whether an individual is a suspect, triggering the rights warning
requirement. Otherwise, defense counsel and the Tribunal will
have no standard against which to measure the prosecutor's ac-
tions.
2. The Right to Counsel
In addition to the right against self-incrimination, the Tri-
bunal's rules provide for the right to counsel. The Tribunal's
rules provide that a suspect shall be advised of "the right to be
assisted by counsel of his own choice or to have legal assistance
assigned to him without payment if he does not have sufficient
means to pay for it."82 Additionally, "[q]uestioning of a suspect
shall not proceed without the presence of counsel unless the sus-
pect has voluntarily waived his right to counsel."13 Once the ac-
cused invokes the right to counsel, questioning must cease and
may only be resumed when the suspect has obtained or is as-
signed counsel.84 This right to counsel continues throughout
the trial and the appeal.
80. MIL. R. EVID. 305(b)(1).
81. United States v. Morris, 13 M.J. 297, 298 (C.M.A. 1982).
82. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 42(A) (i), at 18.
83. Id. R. 42(B), at 19.
84. Id.
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These provisions are consistent with military law, which sim-
ilarly provides a right to counsel at a very early stage in the pro-
ceedings. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides that " [i] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."85
This right to counsel, however, does not attach until the initia-
tion of adversary judicial proceedings.8 " The military justice sys-
tem codifies and broadens this right to counsel by requiring per-
sons acting in a law enforcement capacity to advise an accused of
his or her right to counsel before conducting an interrogation
"subsequent to the preferral of charges or the imposition of pre-
trial restraint."87 These two events, preferralas and pretrial re-
straint, 9 typically occur earlier than civilian indictment, infor-
mation, preliminary hearing, or arraignment. Thus, the military
justice system, like the Tribunal's rules, protects the right to
counsel at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Attaching the
right to counsel at this early stage ensures the fairness of the
pretrial investigation by providing counsel not just during criti-
cal stages in the judicial proceedings, but also during critical
stages in the investigative process. As such, defense counsel will
be better able to ensure the accused understands his or her
rights and knowingly exercises or waives those rights.
Under military law, however, military suspects are also enti-
tled to counsel at line-ups or show-ups conducted after the
preferral of charges or imposition of pretrial restraint.90 The
Tribunal's rules make no provision for counsel during identifica-
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
86. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). The Court has held that:
Whatever else it may mean, the right to counsel granted by the Sixth ...
[Amendment] means at least that a person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at
or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him -
'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, informa-
tion, or arraignment.'
Id. at 398 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1971)).
87. MIL. R. EVID. 305(d) (1) (B).
88. "Preferral" of charges is the act of swearing to the validity of charges by one
with personal knowledge of the charge or one who has investigated the charges. R.C.M.
307(b).
89. "Pretrial restraint" includes: conditions on liberty, restriction to specific limits,
arrest, and confinement. R.C.M. 304.
90. MIL. R. EviD. 321(b) (2) (A). Civilian suspects are not entitled to this protec-
tion unless the line-up or show-up occurs after initiation of adversary judicial proceed-
ings. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
236-37 (1967).
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tions, absent questioning by the prosecutor.9' The absence of
this procedural safeguard diminishes the ability of defense coun-
sel to effectively represent his or her client. The presence of
counsel at identifications, even where no questioning of the sus-
pect or accused occurs, ensures that the defense counsel can re-
construct the lineup and effectively cross-examine the eyewitness
at trial to challenge the reliability of the identification.9" More-
over, the defense counsel's presence provides him or her the op-
portunity to suggest measures to ensure that the identification
process is fairly and reliably conducted. 93
The Tribunal rules present one final distinction regarding
the right to counsel. Under the Tribunal rules, the accused has
the right to counsel of his or her own choice or to have ap-
pointed counsel if he or she is indigent.94 On the other hand,
all service members, regardless of financial resources or indi-
gency status, are entitled to military counsel, either appointed or
of their own selection if that counsel is reasonably available. The
military accused may also retain civilian counsel at his or her
own expense instead of, or in addition to, military counsel.95
The possibility of multiple counsel, some provided free of
charge, some selected by the accused, ensures the adequacy of
the accused's representation.
3. The Indictment Process
If, during the course of the investigation, the prosecutor is
"satisfied that there is reasonable grounds for believing that a
91. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 42(A)(i), at 18 (indicating that right to counsel
warning required prior to questioning suspect); Id. R. 63, at 26 (stating right to counsel
warning required prior to questioning accused after initial appearance before tribu-
nal).
92. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 232 (requiring counsel at line-up even where no question-
ing occurs).
93. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 230 n.5 (1977) (suggesting various ways defense
counsel could have ensured fairness of identification process consisting of eyewitness
identification of accused seated at counsel table during his preliminary hearing, includ-
ing: seeking delay until legitimate line-up could be conducted; seeking exclusion of
eyewitness from courtroom until identification; and seeking permission to seat accused
with public).
94. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 42(A)(i), at 18. Indigency status is to be deter-
mined by the Registrar of the Tribunal pursuant to criteria established by the Registrar.
The Registrar of the Tribunal is required to maintain a list of qualified counsel willing
to be assigned to indigent suspects or accused. Id. R.R. 44, 45, at 19-20.
95. R.C.M. 506.
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suspect has committed a crime," the Tribunal rules require the
prosecutor to prepare an indictment. 96 The prosecutor then for-
wards the indictment and accompanying material to a trial
chamber judge for review.97 On reviewing the indictment, the
judge is required to "hear the [p]rosecutor, who may present
additional material in support of the count," and then confirm
or dismiss the indictment or adjourn the review.98 Although the
rules are silent regarding the standard for review of the indict-
ment, it seems logical that the judge review the adequacy of the
prosecutor's reasonable grounds or probable cause determina-
tions. If the judge dismisses the indictment, the rules do not
preclude the prosecutor from bringing a new indictment at a
later date based upon additional evidence. 99
To some degree, this indictment-confirmation process is
similar to grand jury proceedings, with the reviewing judge play-
ing the role of the grand jury. In this regard, the reviewing
judge protects the suspect from meritless charges. This proce-
dure does not, however, protect an innocent individual as well as
the analogous military procedure: the pretrial investigation.
Article 32 of the UCMJ provides the military equivalent of
grand jury proceedings. 100 Under military law, an individual
may not be tried by general courts-martial, a felony level court,
unless first subjected to a pretrial investigation pursuant to Arti-
cle 32.101 Article 32 pretrial investigations combine features of
grand jury proceedings and preliminary hearings by holding
open hearings10 2 with the accused present 0 3 and represented by
counsel.1 0 4 In contrast, the Tribunal rules do not require a pub-
96. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R 47(A), at 21. The indictment must identify the sus-
pect and include "a concise statement of the facts of the case and of the crime with
which the suspect is charged." Id. R. 47(B), at 21.
97. Id. . 47(C), at 21.
98. Id. P, 47(D), at 21.
99. Id. R. 47(E), at 21.
100. United States v. Powell, 17 MJ. 975, 976 (A.C.M.R. 1984).
101. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); R.C.M. 405(a).
102. R.C.M. 405(h)(3). Although ordinarily the proceedings are open, the ap-
pointing authority or the investigating officer may close a hearing. Id.
103. R.C.M. 405(f)(3).
104. R.C.M. 405(f) (4). The right to counsel includes the right to appointed mili-
tary counsel (detailed defense counsel), military counsel of the accused's own selection
(individual military counsel), and civilian counsel. Military counsel are provided free of
charge. Civilian counsel are retained at no expense to the U.S. Government. The ac-
cused could also proceed pro se if he or she does so in "good faith and not solely to vex
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lic indictment-confirmation process105 or the presence of the ac-
cused with his or her counsel. At an Article 32 pretrial investiga-
tion, not only is the accused and his or her counsel present, but
the accused has the right to cross-examine Government wit-
nesses, 10 6 to present evidence in his or her own behalf,10 7 and to
testify.' 08 There is no comparable right to cross-examine wit-
nesses or present a defense during the indictment-confirmation
process. Finally, the accused in the military proceeding has a
limited right of discovery prior to the Article 32 pretrial investi-
gation. 10 9 The accused before the Tribunal has no right to dis-
covery prior to or during the indictment-confirmation process.
Like the indictment-confirmation process and grand jury
proceedings, the purpose of Article 32 pretrial investigations is
to protect the accused from baseless charges by requiring that
the charges be supported by probable cause. A comparison of
the indictment-confirmation process and the analogous military
proceeding, the Article 32 pretrial investigation, however,
reveals that the indictment-confirmation process may not be as
adequate as the military pretrial investigation in protecting an
innocent individual from baseless charges.
Moreover, unlike the indictment-confirmation process and
grand jury proceedings, pretrial investigations serve two other
very important purposes. First, pretrial investigations provide
the officer who convened the investigation with information
upon which to base a disposition decision. Second, pretrial in-
vestigations present the defense with an opportunity for pretrial
the prosecution or the court" and is deemed to be competent. United States v. Bramel,
29 M.J. 958, 966 (A.C.M.R. 1990).
105. But see I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 52, 53, at 22-23. These two rules require
public disclosure of confirmed indictments unless the judge reviewing the indictment
orders non-disclosure until it is served on the accused, or a judge or trial chamber
orders otherwise "in the interests ofjustice." Id.
106. R.C.M. 405(f) (8). The accused is given broad latitude to cross-examine gov-
ernment witnesses. R.C.M. 405(h) (1) (A). But see R.C.M. 405(i) analysis (concerning
Rule 303 of the Military Rules of Evidence, which prohibits degrading questions).
107. R.C.M. 405(f) (9) (indicating witnesses are to be produced if reasonably avail-
able); R.C.M. 405(f) (10) (indicating that evidence within government's control must be
produced); R.C.M. 405(f) (11) (presenting evidence in defense, extenuation, and/or
mitigation).
108. R.C.M. 405(f) (12). The accused may elect to make a sworn statement subject
to cross-examination, to make an unsworn statement that may be rebutted but which
does not subject the accused to cross-examination, or to remain silent. R.C.M.
405(h) (1) (B).
109. R.C.M. 405(g)(1)(B).
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discovery.1 10
The indictment-confirmation process does not provide the
accused with these two additional advantages. At the pretrial in-
vestigation the defense is able to challenge the Government's ev-
idence and introduce its own evidence. In doing so, the defense
may be able to influence the decision of the convening authority
and have the charges dismissed. Because the accused and coun-
sel are not present during the indictment-confirmation proceed-
ings, however, the defense has no similar opportunity to influ-
ence the disposition of the case at this early stage. Furthermore,
at the pretrial investigation, the defense has the opportunity to
weigh, first-hand, the strength of the Government's case and its
underlying theory. This gives the defense a head-start on pre-
paring for trial. The accused before the Tribunal, however, is
not afforded this opportunity. Consequently, the defense coun-
sel before the Tribunal is at a disadvantage, compared to de-
fense counsel in military criminal practice.
4. Pretrial Detention
While civilian accuseds are entitled to bail set at an amount
reasonably calculated,111 the military justice system does not pro-
vide for a system of bail.1 12 Instead, military law permits pretrial
confinement only if the Government can establish: (1) probable
cause that a crime has been committed, (2) the accused commit-
ted the crime, (3) confinement is necessary to ensure the ac-
cused's presence at trial or to prevent further serious miscon-
duct, and (4) less severe forms of restraint would be inade-
110. R.C.M. 405(a) discussion ("The primary purpose of the investigation ... is to
inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the charges, the form of the charges,
and to secure information on which to determine what disposition should be made of
the case. The investigation also serves as a means of discovery."). See also United States
v. Roberts, 10 M.J. 308 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. Hutson, 42 C.M.R. 39 (C.MA
1970); United States v. Samuels, 27 C.M.R. 280, 285-86 (C.M.A. 1959).
111. The U.S. Constitution prohibits excessive bail. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This
prohibition does not create a right to release but only provides that bail, if appropriate
at all, not be excessive. This means that bail must not be fixed at "a figure higher than
an amount reasonably calculated" to assure the accused's presence at trial. Stack v.
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
112. Although there is no bail provision in military law, the justifications for bail
provisions are inapplicable to the military because service members continue to receive
pay and benefits while in pretrial confinement and do not risk loss of employment.
Gilligan & Wims, supra note 14, at 5.
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quate.1 3 These determinations, which are made by the suspect's
commander, are subject to an elaborate review process before a
neutral magistrate with the suspect present and entitled to repre-
sentation. 114
Under the Tribunal rules, once the prosecutor indicts a sus-
pect and a trial chamber judge confirms the indictment,1 5 the
judge may issue an arrest warrant." 6 Upon arrest, the rules re-
quire the arresting State to transfer the accused to the Hague for
detention pending arraignment and trial. 117 A trial chamber
can only release a detained suspect or accused in exceptional
circumstances." 8 Although the indictment-confirmation pro-
cess includes a probable cause determination, the rule is silent
regarding what exceptional circumstances might justify release.
Moreover, the rule permits pretrial detention without requiring
the prosecutor to demonstrate the necessity of the confinement.
Instead, the accused is required to satisfy the trial chamber that
he or she "will appear for trial and, if released, will not pose a
danger to any victim, witness or other person."1 9 This places an
unfair burden on the accused to prove two negatives: that he
will not flee and that he will not hurt anyone. Instead, the Tri-
bunal rules should place the burden upon the prosecutor to
demonstrate that the accused is a flight risk or a threat to an-
other person. Given the nature of the crimes involved, the pros-
ecutor should be able to satisfy this burden with ease. A per se
rule, like the one adopted, does not seem to have any purpose.
The pretrial detention sentence credit provisions present an
additional problem. In determining a sentence, the Tribunal
rules require it to take into account "the period, if any, during
which the convicted person was detained in custody pending his
surrender to the Tribunal or pending trial."'20 and to give credit
for any such time. 12 1 Thus, the Tribunal rules provide for a day-
for-day credit for any detention served prior to trial to be applied
toward any future sentence. The rules fail to' indicate, however,
113. R.C.M. 305(h)(2)(B).
114. R.C.M. 305(i).
115. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 47, at 21.
116. Id. R.R. 54, 55, at 23.
117. Id. R. 57, at 24.
118. Id. R. 65, at 27.
119. Id. R. 65(B), at 27.
120. Id. R. 101 (B) (iv), at 39.
121. Id. R. 101(E), at 39.
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how this credit is to be calculated, whether additional credit is
available for violations of any of the accused's procedural rights
and whether credit is available for other forms of restraint tanta-
mount to detention.
Under military law, the convicted accused is entitled to
credit towards the sentence imposed under four separate theo-
ries. First, the accused is entitled to a day-for-day credit for any
pretrial confinement. 122 Second, the accused is entitled to day-
for-day credit for any "pretrial restriction equivalent to confine-
ment."12 Third, the accused is entitled to additional day-for-day
credit for any confinement served in violation of his pretrial con-
finement procedural rights." 4 Finally, the accused is entitled to
credit for illegal conditions of pretrial restraint.1 2 5 These four
theories for crediting an accused for pretrial confinement over-
lap and the accused may receive multiple credits.'2 6 The possi-
bility of multiple credit for pretrial restraint compensates the ac-
cused for time-served awaiting trial, vindicates violations of the
accused's rights, and deters intentional violations of the ac-
cused's rights. The Tribunal should similarly provide a means of
vindicating the accused's rights when violated in this regard.
5. Discovery
Once the accused has been arrested and makes his or her
initial appearance before the Tribunal, the Tribunal rules pro-
vide for broad and open discovery. "[A] s soon as practicable af-
ter the initial appearance of the accused," the prosecutor must
122. United States v. Allen, 17 MJ. 126, 128 (C.MA 1984).
123. United States v. Mason, 19 M.J. 274 (C.M.A. 1985) (citing United States v.
Schilf, 1 M.J. 251, 252 (C.M.A. 1976)).
124. R.C.M. 305(k). The accused, for example, may be entitled to additional
credit when the decision to place the accused in pretrial confinement was not subject to
a neutral and independent review before a magistrate. See, e.g., United States v. Russell,
30 M.J. 977, 978 (A.C.M.R. 1990) (defendant granted additional 44 days of credit be-
cause pretrial restraint not reviewed by neutral magistrate).
125. 10 U.S.C. § 813 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also United States v. Suzuki, 14
M.J. 491, 493 (C.M.A. 1983).
126. For example, if an accused were ordered to remain in his barracks room
under guard for 30 days prior to trial, this would constitute pretrial restraint that was
equivalent to confinement. The accused would be entitled to at least 60 days credit: 30
days credit for the restraint tantamount to confinement, and 30 days for the violation of
his procedural rights, with potential for additional credit if the conditions of confine-
ment constituted illegal pretrial punishment. See, e.g., United States v. Gregory, 21 M.J.
952, 956 (A.C.M.R. 1986), aff'd, 23 MJ. 246 (C.M.A. 1986).
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provide the defense "copies of the supporting material which ac-
companied the indictment when confirmation was sought as well
as all prior statements obtained by the prosecutor from the ac-
cused or from prosecution witnesses." 12 7 This presumably in-
cludes any additional material presented by the prosecutor dur-
ing the indictment-confirmation process.12 ' Additionally, on de-
fense request, the prosecutor must permit the defense "to
inspect any books, documents, photographs and tangible objects
in his custody or control, which are material to the preparation
of the defence, or are intended for use by the prosecutor as evi-
dence at trial or were obtained from or belonged to the ac-
cused." 2 9 Prior to trial, the prosecution must notify the defense
of the witnesses it intends to call in its case-in-chief and any wit-
nesses it intends to call in rebuttal to an alibi defense or any
other special defense, including diminished or lack of mental
responsibility. 1 0 Finally, the prosecutor is required to disclose
any exculpatory evidence or any evidence "which may affect the
credibility of prosecution witnesses." 3'
The Tribunal rules also place a discovery burden upon the
defense. The defense is required to disclose "any books, docu-
ments, photographs and tangible objects, which are within the
custody or control of the defence and which it intends to use as
evidence at the trial.""' 2 This requirement, however, is not trig-
gered unless the defense has requested discovery of similar mate-
rial from the prosecutor.1 3 3 Also under the Tribunal rules, the
defense is required to notify the prosecutor of its intent to pres-
ent the defense of alibi or any other special defense.13 1
The obligation to disclose evidence or material continues
until trial, and, if either the prosecutor or the defense discovers
127. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 66(A), at 27.
128. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (outlining process of review of in-
dictment during which prosecutor may present additional material).
129. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 66(B), at 27-28. But see id. R. 66(C), at 28. Under
Rule 66(C) the Prosecutor may apply, in camera, to the trial chamber to be relieved of
this obligation where disclosure would prejudice ongoing investigations, would be con-
trary to public policy, or would affect a state's security interest. Id.
130. Id. R. 67(A), at 27.
131. Id. R. 68, at 29.
132. Id. R. 67(C), at 29.
133. Id. See alo supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing prosecution's
required disclosure of evidence which is material to preparation of defense upon re-
quest).
134. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 67(A) (ii), at 28.
U.N. JUSTICE OR MILITARY JUSTICE
additional evidence that should have been disclosed under any
of the above rules, they must promptly notify the other party.'13
In discussing the Tribunal's discovery rules, one commentator
has observed that:
[The] reciprocal disclosure of evidence by the prosecution
and the defense is unusual, at least in many common law ju-
risdictions. Because the prosecution is considered to be the
stronger of the two parties and bears the burden of proof, it is
often obliged to disclose, whereas the defense is usually not
required to disclose anything in advance. The procedure
under the rule is commendable in that it conduces to an even
combat and reduces the possibility of surprise at trial. Never-
theless, inasmuch as the prosecutor has an absolute obliga-
tion ... to disclose incriminating evidence, the rules overall
appear to tilt the scales in favor of the accused. 13 6
This criticism is understandable given the unusual nature of
the Tribunal's discovery rules. To those familiar with the discov-
ery rules of military law, however, the Tribunal rules do not tilt
the scales in favor of the accused, but rather tilt the scales in
favor of truth-seeking instead of gamesmanship. Comparison of
the Tribunal's discovery rules with the military's rules reveals
they are similar to, and appear to be based on, the discovery
rules used in courts-martial,' 37 which are broader than their civil-
ian counterparts.13  The purpose of such broad discovery is
summarized as follows:
The [discovery] rule is intended to promote full discov-
ery to the maximum extent possible consistent with legitimate
needs for nondisclosure and to eliminate "gamesmanship"
from the discovery process ....
Providing broad discovery at an early stage reduces pre-
trial motions practice and surprise and delay at trial. It leads
to better informed judgement about the merits of the case
and encourages early decisions concerning withdrawal of
135. Id. R. 67(D), at 29. Under military law, the prosecutor and defense counsel
have a continuing duty to disclose. See R.C.M. 701(d).
136. Nsereko, supra note 5, at 536.
137. R.C.M. 701.
138. United States v. Trimper, 26 M.J. 534, 536 (A.F.C.M.R. 1988); (citing United
States v. Eshalomi, 23 MJ. 12 (C.MA 1986)) ("Military law provides a direct means of
discovery that is broader than that normally available to an accused in a civilian crimi-
nal prosecution").
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charges, motions, pleas and composition of court-martial. In
short, experience has shown that broad discovery contributes
substantially to the truth-finding process and to the efficiency
with which it functions. It is essential to the administration of
military justice; because assembling the military judge, coun-
sel, members, accused, and witnesses is frequently costly and
time consuming, clarification or resolution of matters before
trial is essential.13 9
Certainly, the justifications underlying the military's wide-rang-
ing, open, and reciprocal discovery rules apply equally to the Tri-
bunal. Such rules will advance the truth-seeking process, in-
crease the Tribunal's efficiency, and lend itself to early resolu-
tion of issues. There are two areas of concern, however, in the
Tribunal's discovery rules.
First, the rules fail to provide any guidance regarding the
result of failure by the prosecutor to disclose discoverable infor-
mation. Although the Tribunal rules indicate the "[i] ailure of
the defence to provide notice [of special defenses] shall not
limit the right of the accused to testify on the above defenses,"1 4 °
the rules are silent regarding the result when the prosecutor fails
to provide discovery. Military law details the remedies available
for nondisclosure of discoverable information. If the failure is
discovered after trial, the failure to disclose is a constitutional
violation and the conviction or sentence is set aside.141 If the
failure is discovered during trial, the military judge has broad
discretion to order discovery, dismiss the charges, grant a contin-
uance, prohibit introduction of the evidence, or issue such other
order as is just under the circumstances.' The Tribunal should
amend its rules to similarly clarify the result of nondisclosure.
Second, the Tribunal rules include two provisions regarding
information not subject to disclosure. The first provision, mak-
ing attorney work product nondiscoverable, does not present
much difficulty. 43 The second provision, however, potentially
renders a tremendous volume of information nondiscoverable.
Rule 70(B) provides that:
If the [p] rosecutor is in possession of information which has
139. R.C.M. 701 analysis.
140. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 67(B), at 29.
141. Eshalomi, 23 MJ. at 22-23.
142. R.C.M. 701(g) (3).
143. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 70(A), at 29-30.
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been provided him on a confidential basis and which has
been used solely for the purpose of generating new evidence,
that initial information and its origin shall not be disclosed by
the [p]rosecutor without the consent of the person or entity
providing the information.1 44
Although the prosecutor is not permitted to introduce this evi-
dence "without prior disclosure to the accused,"14 the prosecu-
tor does not have to disclose this information if he does not in-
troduce it. Protection against discovery would seem to exist even
if the information was exculpatory as long as the person provid-
ing the information did so on a confidential basis. Because of
the nature of the crimes involved, situations in which informa-
tion is received on such a confidential basis may be common. As
these rules represent precedent for future tribunals, Rule 70(B)
is too susceptible to abuse to remain a tool of the prosecution.
An unscrupulous prosecutor could use such a rule to shield in-
formation and evidence by assuring witnesses of its confidential
nature and then not make a good faith effort to obtain that per-
son's consent. Due to its susceptibility to abuse, the Tribunal
should discard Rule 70(B).
6. Speedy Trial
Although the Tribunal's statute requires that the accused be
tried without undue delay,14 6 the rules fail to provide proce-
dures or standards for ensuring compliance with this require-
ment. The rules merely reiterate that once an accused has been
arrested and transferred to the Tribunal, the accused "shall be
brought before a [t]rial [c]hamber without delay"14 7 for an Ar-
raignment procedure.1 48
In contrast, a military accused must be brought to trial
within 120 days of notice to the accused of a preferral of charges
or imposition of pretrial restraint.1 49 This rule is scrupulously
protected and the accused must be brought to trial within this
144. Id. R 70(B), at 30.
145. Id.
146. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 28, 1 107; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 2, art. 21, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 44-45, 32 I.L.M. at 1198-99.
147. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 62, at 26.
148. Id.
149. R.C.M. 707(a).
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period unless a delay is approved in advance. 150 The remedy for
a failure to comply with the right to a speedy trial is drastic: "dis-
missal of the affected charges." 151
Although a 120 day speedy trial clock may be inappropriate
given the potential logistical difficulties involved in the cases to
be brought before the Tribunal, the rules should be amended to
clarify the nature of the speedy trial right, and the remedy for
failure to comply with this right. This is especially necessary be-
cause of the lack of a system of bail or pretrial release.
B. Trial Procedure
The Tribunal rules generally provide for public 152 adver-
sarial trials similar to trials in criminal cases in the United States.
The rules provide for preliminary motions, 5 ' followed by: open-
ing statements, 154 presentation of evidence,1 55 closing argu-
150. R.C.M. 707(c) ("[A]II other pretrial delays approved by a military judge or the
convening authority shall be excluded when determining whether the period in
[R.C.M. 707(a)] has run."). See also United States v. Carlisle, 25 MJ. 426, 428 (C.MA
1988) ("[E]ach day that an accused is available for trial is chargeable to the Govern-
ment, unless a delay has been approved by either the convening authority or the mili-
tary judge, in writing or on the record.").
151. R.C.M. 707(d). The dismissal of affected charges may be with or without prej-
udice. Id. The dismissal must be with prejudice if the "accused has been deprived of
his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial." Id.; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.
514, 522 (1972). Otherwise, whether dismissal is with or without prejudice is within the
discretion of the militaryjudge. The militaryjudge makes this determination by consid-
ering "the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case that lead to
dismissal; the impact of a reprosecution on the administration ofjustice; and any preju-
dice to the accused resulting from the denial of a speedy trial." R.C.M. 707(d).
152. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 78, at 33 ("[a]ll proceedings.., other than delib-
erations... shall be held in public, unless otherwise provided"). A trial chamber may
exclude the press and public "from all or part of [a] proceeding ... for reasons of (i)
public order or morality; (ii) safety, security or non-disclosure of the identity of a victim
or witness... ; or (iii) the protection of the interests ofjustice." Id. R. 79(A), at 33-34.
153. Id. R.R. 72, 73, at 31. Included in the list of preliminary motions are chal-
lenges based on the lack ofjurisdiction or defects in the indictment, requests for exclu-
sion of evidence, application for severance of charges or for separate trials, and objec-
tions based on denial of requested counsel. Id. R. 73, at 31.
154. Id. R. 84, at 35. Rule 84 provides that "[b]efore presentation of the evidence
by the Prosecutor, each party may make an opening statement. The defense may how-
ever elect to make its statement after the Prosecutor has concluded his presentation of
evidence and before the presentation of evidence for the defense." Id.
155. Id. R. 85, at 35. Rule 85 provides that, "[u]nless otherwise directed.., in the
interests ofjustice," the order of evidence presentation should be "(i) evidence for the
prosecution; (ii) evidence for the defence; (iii) prosecution evidence in rebuttal; (iv)
defence evidence in rejoinder; [and] evidence ordered by the Trial Chamber." Id.
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ments,156 deliberations, 157 announcement of judgement, 158 and,
if necessary, sentencing. 59 Within the trial procedures there are
several areas that prompt comparison to the military justice sys-
tem and analysis of whether the procedures adequately protect
the accused.
1. Forum Choice
In the military justice system, the accused has the right to
choose trial by a military judge alone or before the military
equivalent of a jury.16 ° This jury is selected by the officer who
convened the court-martial based upon his or her judgement
concerning who would be "best qualified for the duty by reason
of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and
judicial temperament."161 Although the convening authority has
broad discretion in selecting those among his command who are
best qualified, the convening authority is forbidden from exert-
ing influence on those selected.1 "2 The selected panel is sub-
156. Id. R. 86, at 35. Rule 86 provides that, after the close of evidence, "the Prose-
cutor may present an initial argument, to which the defence may reply." Id. If the
defense does reply, "[t ] he Prosecutor may, if he wishes, present a rebuttal argument, to
which the defence may present a rejoinder." Id.
157. Id. R. 87, at 36. Deliberations are conducted in private and a guilty verdict
reached only if a majority of the trial chamber agree that guilt has been proven beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id.
158. Id. R. 88, at 36. The verdict is required to be pronounced in public and
accompanied with, or followed by, a reasoned written opinion to which any dissent may
be appended. Id.
159. Id. R.R. 99-106, at 39-42.
160. R.C.M. 903. Although the accused may request to be tried by the military
judge alone, the accused has no right to a trial byjudge alone. United States v. Ward, 3
MJ. 365, 367 (C.M.A. 1977). The military judge, however, must state the reason for
denying a request to be tried by judge alone. United States v. Butler, 14 MJ. 72, 73
(C.MA 1982).
161. 10 U.S.C. § 825(d) (2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The convening authority may
not use rank as a device for deliberate exclusion of qualified court members. United
States v. Daigle, 1 M.J. 139, 141 (C.MA 1975). The convening authority also may not
manipulate the criteria to exclude those more likely to adjudge light sentences. United
States v. McClain, 22 MJ. 124, 130 (C.MA 1986). Although deliberate exclusion is
prohibited, it appears that deliberate "inclusion" is not prohibited if the inclusion is for
a proper reason. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 MJ. 242, 248-49 (C.MA 1988)
(holding that it is appropriate to consider gender in selecting court members if done in
good faith effort to assure panel is representative of military population). The accused
is not entitled to a cross-sectional representation of the military community. See United
States v. Hodge, 26 MJ. 596, 598 (A.C.M.R. 1988); United States v. Carter, 25 MJ. 471,
473 (C.M.A. 1988).
162. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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jected to voir dire163 and challenges 164 before the final panel is
seated. Although the service members selected are usually of-
ficers, an enlisted accused has the right to demand at least one-
third enlisted representation on the panel.1 65 Alternatively, the
accused may waive his or her right to such a jury trial and elect
to be tried before a military judge alone."*
This flexibility in forum selection is often advantageous to
the accused. For example, the accused may elect to be tried
before a military judge alone when the facts and circumstances
of the case may inflame the passions of a lay jury but not of a
seasoned jurist. Similarly, the accused may desire to be tried
before a jury if the defense will be able to raise a reasonable
doubt, fostered by the ingenuity, imagination, and skill of the
defense counsel.
The accused before the Tribunal shares no similar flexibility
in forum structure. The accused is tried before one of two trial
chambers, with the right to appeal to an appeals chamber.1 67
Although the accused may challenge the qualifications of a
judge, 6 ' the basis for disqualification appears to be limited to
those instances where ajudge has a personal interest in the mat-
ter or an association that might affect his or her impartiality. 69
The only remaining limitations on qualifications are that the
judge who reviews and confirms an indictment is disqualified
from sitting as a trial chamber-judge for the same accused,1 70
and ajudge may not act upon the appeal of a case in which he or
she was a member of the trial chamber.171
2. Guilty Pleas
In North Carolina v. Alford,172 the U.S. Supreme Court found
163. R.C.M. 912(d).
164. R.C.M. 912(f), (g). Each party is entitled to unlimited challenges for "cause"
and one peremptory challenge. Id.
165. 10 U.S.C. § 825(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
166. Weiss, 114 S.Ct. at 756.
167. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 18, 1 69-71; Tribunal Stat-
ute, supra note 2, art. 11, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 39, 32 I.L.M. at 1195.
168. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 15(B), at 9-10.
169. Id. R. 15(A), at 9.
170. Id. R. 15(C), at 10.
171. Id. R. 15(D), at 10.
172. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970). See also Gilligan & Wims,
supra note 14, at 37.
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guilty pleas constitutional provided that there was a factual basis
for the plea, even if the accused expressly maintained his or her
innocence.1 73 Such an inconsistent plea is not permitted under
military law.1 7  Under military law, if an accused chooses to
plead guilty, he or she must expressly admit guilt in open court
and under oath. Military law requires the judge to question the
accused at length to determine whether there is a factual basis
for the plea, whether any defense exists, and whether the ac-
cused is pleading guilty freely and voluntarily. 175 Such a proce-
dure, although somewhat paternalistic, protects the military ac-
cused from government overreaching and collusion between the
prosecutor and the defense counsel.
Moreover, the military justice system provides for condi-
tional guilty pleas. 176 A conditional guilty plea permits the ac-
cused, with the approval of the military judge and the consent of
the Government, to plead guilty while reserving the right to ap-
peal an adverse determination on a specified pretrial motion. If
successful on appeal, the accused may then withdraw the plea of
guilty.' 77
By comparison, the Tribunal rules fail to establish a proce-
dure for determining the validity or voluntariness of a guilty plea
or a procedure for the accused to enter a conditional guilty plea.
Instead, the rules merely provide that if the accused pleads guilty
when called upon to enter a plea, then the trial chamber shall
"instruct the Registrar to set a date for the pre-sentence hear-
ing." 17 This failure leaves open the possibility of coerced, invol-
untary, or untruthful pleas. At a minimum, the Tribunal should
establish procedures for ensuring the factual basis of the plea
and that the plea is made voluntarily.
3. Immunity and Plea Bargaining
The absence in the Tribunal rules of a mechanism for the
prosecutor to grant immunity and enter into a plea agreement
173. Id, Alford, 400 U.S. at 38.
174. The militaryjudge must resolve inconsistencies and apparent defenses and, if
unable to do so, must reject the guilty plea. See United States v. Jemmings, 1 MJ. 414,
417-18 (C.MA 1976); United States v. Jackson, 23 MJ. 650, 652 (N.M.C.M.R. 1986).
175. R.C.M. 910(c)-(e).
176. R.C.M. 910(a) (2).
177. Id.
178. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 62(iv), at 26.
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presents a related issue. In common law systems, the prosecutor
has broad power to offer immunity to the accused in return for
the accused's cooperation in the investigation or prosecution of
other cases.1 79 Often, the grant of immunity is in conjunction
with a plea bargain agreement between the prosecutor and the
accused whereby the accused agrees to plead guilty in return for
a limitation on his or her punishment."' 0
The Tribunal could have adopted procedures similar to
those of the military justice system, which permits the convening
authority to grant immunity and enter into plea agreements with
the accused and adopt procedures for the acceptance of the plea
agreement by the Tribunal. Under the military justice system,
the accused can enter into a pretrial agreement with the conven-
ing authority as to the offenses to which the accused will plead
guilty.1 81 In return, the convening authority may agree to a ceil-
ing on the sentence and/or to withdraw and dismiss certain
charges. 8 2 If the sentencing authority, the military judge or the
jury, imposes a less severe sentence than the ceiling agreed
upon, the convening authority may only approve the less severe
sentence. Likewise, if the sentencing authority imposes a sen-
tence that exceeds the limits of the pretrial agreement, the con-
vening authority may only approve the sentence agreed upon.18 3
To ensure this advantage to the accused, the sentencing author-
ity does not know the sentence limitation terms of the pretrial
agreement when independently imposing a sentence.18 4
The Tribunal, instead, adopted an approach that permits an
abbreviated proceeding in which an accused merely acknowl-
179. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 54.
180. Id. Most civil law systems do not permit the prosecutor to unilaterally grant
immunity or enter into plea agreements. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIvIL LAW
TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1080-82 (1994).
181. R.C.M. 705(b)(1). The accused may promise to enter into a stipulation of
fact concerning the offenses to which he or she is pleading guilty; promise to testify
against another person; promise to pay restitution; promise to conform his or her con-
duct to certain conditions of probation; or promise to waive certain procedural require-
ments. R.C.M. 705(c) (2).
182. R.C.M. 705(b) (2). Additionally, the convening authority may promise to re-
fer charges to a court-martial with less punishment authority; refer a capital offense as
non-capital; or order the prosecutor to present no evidence on one or more specifica-
tions resulting in a not guilty finding on the affected specifications. Id.
183. R.C.M. 1006(d) (3).
184. R.C.M. 705(e). See also R.C.M. 1005(e) (1) (militaryjurors instructed on maxi-
mum authorized sentence and any mandatory minimum sentence).
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edges guilt and the court considers the accused's cooperation
with authorities in mitigation of his or her punishment. 18 This
does not, however, permit the accused to receive a commitment
in advance of trial as to the exact exchange for his or her cooper-
ation.
The absence of such mechanisms diminishes the prosecu-
tor's ability to successfully prosecute higher-level suspects before
the Tribunal through the cooperation of lower-level suspects.
Moreover, the absence of such a mechanism hinders the prose-
cutor's ability to negotiate ajust result without having to put vul-
nerable victims or witnesses through the ordeal of a trial or to
negotiate victim compensation as part of the agreement.
C. Sentencing
Consistent with its general adversarial framework, the Tribu-
nal rules fashion an adversarial presentencing process somewhat
similar to the presentencing process of the military justice sys-
tem. Under the Tribunal rules, during a separate sentencing
phase, both the prosecutor and the defense are entitled to sub-
mit "any relevant information that may assist the [t]rial
[c]hamber in determining an appropriate sentence."8 6 This
permits both parties the opportunity to present evidence that
may not have been admissible during the trial on the merits, but
which is relevant to the determination of an appropriate sen-
tence.
Beyond permitting both parties the opportunity to present
evidence, the Tribunal rules fail both to establish detailed proce-
dures for conducting the presentencing hearing and to clearly
indicate whether the rules of evidence apply during presentenc-
ing. i  In contrast, the military justice system provides detailed
procedures covering the order of evidence production,8 " per-
185. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, 1L 101 (B) (ii), at 40.
186. Id. R. 100, at 39.
187. The Tribunal rules indicate "[t]he rules of evidence . . . shall govern the
proceedings before the Chambers." Id. R. 89(A), at 36-37. It remains unclear whether
"proceedings before the Chambers" include presentencing hearings.
188. R.C.M. 1001(a) (1) (A). Ordinarily, the following sequence is followed: (1)
presentation by the prosecutor; (2) presentation by the defense; (3) rebuttal and surre-
buttal; (4) argument by the prosecutor on sentence; (5) argument by the defense on
sentence; and (6) rebuttal arguments in the discretion of the military judge. R.C.M.
1001 (a) (1).
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missible evidence, a8 9 sworn and unsworn statements by the ac-
cused,1 90 rebuttal and surrebuttal, 19 1 production of witnesses,' 92
and argument.' 93 The rules of evidence apply as well, although
the defense may request that the rules be relaxed during presen-
tencing.194
In determining an appropriate sentence, the Tribunal rules
require the Tribunal to consider a non-exhaustive list of factors.
These factors include: any aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances, the sentencing practice of the courts of the former Yu-
goslavia, any period of pretrial detention, and any punishment
imposed for the same act by a national court and already
served. 9 ' Additionally, the Tribunal's statute requires it to con-
sider the "gravity of the offense and the individual circumstances
of the convicted person."196 Finally, although the Tribunal rules
do not provide a mechanism for the accused to exchange coop-
eration for sentence limitations, 197 the rules do require the court
to consider as a mitigating factor the "substantial cooperation
with the [p]rosecutor by the convicted person before or after
conviction."' 98 Although the Tribunal rules require guilt to be
determined by majority vote of the three judges composing the
trial chamber hearing the case," the rules do not establish pro-
189. The prosecutor is permitted to introduce the service and personal data con-
cerning the accused and his or her prior service, evidence of prior convictions, evi-
dence in aggravation, and evidence of rehabilitative potential. R.C.M. 1001(b). The
defense is entitled to introduce evidence in extenuation or mitigation. R.C.M. 1001 (c).
190. R.C.M. 1001 (c) (2). If the accused gives sworn testimony, the prosecutor is
entitled to cross-examine the accused. Id. If the accused makes an unsworn statement,
the prosecutor is not permitted to cross-examine the accused. Id. The prosecutor may,
however, introduce evidence in rebuttal to any assertions made in an unsworn state-
ment. Id.
191. R.C.M. 1001(d).
192. R.C.M. 1001(e).
193. R.C.M. 1001(g).
194. R.C.M. 1001 (c) (3). If the rules of evidence are relaxed for the defense, the
rules are similarly relaxed for the prosecutor during rebuttal. R.C.M. 1001(d). See also
MIL. R. EVID. 101(a) analysis ("Although the Rules apply to sentencing they may be
'relaxed' under Rule 1101(c).").
195. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 101(B), at 40.
196. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 29, 115; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 2, art. 24, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 45, 32 IL.M. at 1198-99.
197. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing how acknowledgement
of guilt and cooperation permit abbreviated trials and mitigated sentences).
198. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 101(B) (ii), at 40.
199. Id. R. 87(A), at 36.
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cedures by which the chamber determines an appropriate sen-
tence.
In the militaryjustice system, if the accused elects to be tried
before a military judge alone, the judge closes the court for de-
liberations and determines an appropriate sentence, which is
then announced in open session. If the accused elects to be
tried before jurors, the jurors close for deliberation, discuss ap-
propriate sentences, and vote by secret written ballot on sug-
gested sentences in order of least severity. Once at least two-
thirds of the members agree on a, sentence, that sentence is the
adjudged sentence and is announced in open court.2 °° Courts-
martial have broad latitude in adjudging an appropriate sen-
tence and the sentence can range from no punishment to the
maximum authorized punishment for the particular crime.20'
The Tribunal also has broad latitude in adjudging sentences
in that "[a] convicted person may be sentenced to imprisonment
for a term up to and including the remainder of his life. '202 The
Tribunal's discretion, however, is not limited by stated maxi-
mum punishments. The Tribunal should consider establishing
punishment ranges for various crimes within its jurisdiction. Un-
certainty as to the maximum punishment an accused faces pre-
vents informed decisions regarding pleas and inhibits guilty
pleas.
D. Appellate Procedures
The appellate review process is another aspect of the mili-
tary justice system that distinguishes it from the Tribunal. The
process is largely automatic. It provides multiple avenues for in-
dependent examination of the accused's court-martial for both
legal and factual sufficiency.
Under the Tribunal rules, an appellant must file a notice of
appeal within thirty days after judgement or sentence is pro-
200, R.C.M. 1006(d) (4). Three-fourths of thejurors must agree on the sentence if
the sentence includes confinement for more than 10 years or life. R.C.M.
1006(d)(4)(B). Unanimity on both findings and sentence is required to impose the
death penalty. R.C.M. 1006(d) (4) (A).
201. R.C.M. 1002. This is true unless the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States
imposes a mandatory minimum sentence. Id. The Manual for Courts-Matial, United
States, enumerates the maximum authorized punishments for each offense under the
UCMJ. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, app. 12 (1995) (containing the
Maximum Punishment Chart).
202. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 101(A), at 39-40.
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nounced,20 3 and must file an appellate brief within ninety days
of the certification of the trial record.2 °4 The respondent is
given thirty days from receipt to respond.20 5 After expiration of
the time-limits for briefs, a hearing is scheduled. 2 6 Either party
may request permission to present any evidence that was unavail-
able at the time of trial at this hearing. 20 7 In deciding the issues
before it, the appeals chamber considers the record, any addi-
tional evidence presented, and, presumably, arguments of coun-
sel.208 The decision of the appeals chamber must have the sup-
port of a majority of its five judges and must be supported by a
reasoned opinion. °9
Interestingly, the Tribunal's statute and rules apparently
permit the prosecutor to appeal acquittals and to seek review of
judgements. Article 25 of the Tribunal's statute details the
grounds for appeal and permits either party to appeal: "(1) an
error on a question of law invalidating the decision; or (2) an
error of fact which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice."210
Moreover, both the statute and the rules permit either party to
seek review of the judgement based upon newly discovered evi-
dence that was not known or discoverable through the exercise
of due diligence.2 1  As noted by a Special Task Force of the
American Bar Association Section of International Law and Prac-
tice ("ABA Task Force"), "[i]n either case, an appeal by the
[p] rosecutor, resulting in the reversal of the judgement of the
[t]rial [c]hamber would necessitate a new trial for the same of-
fense, thus evidently violating the principle of non bis in idem-
the prohibition against double jeopardy."212
203. Id. R. 108, at 42.
204. Id. R. 111, at 43.
205. Id. R. 112, at 43. The appellant may file a reply brief within 15 days of receipt
of the respondent's brief. Id. R. 113, at 43.
206. Id. R. 114, at 43.
207. Id. R. 115, at 43. The appeals chamber is required to permit such additional
evidence if "the interests ofjustice so require." Id. Such motion must be filed within 15
days before the hearing. Id.
208. Id. 117(A).
209. Id. 117(B).
210. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 30, 1 120; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 2, art. 25, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 45, 32 I.L.M. at 1199.
211. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 119, at 44. The defense may petition for review of
the judgement at any time, while the prosecutor must petition for review within one
year after the final judgement was pronounced. See also Tribunal Statute, supra note 2,
art. 26, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 46, 32 I.L.M at 1199.
212. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 42.
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The ABA Task Force criticized this right of prosecutorial ap-
peal:
While there certainly is a legitimate and strong interest
in seeing those who have committed crimes against humanity
brought to justice, there appears to be no reason to suppose
that this interest is so compelling that it ought to override the
considerations that underpin the widespread prohibition
against double jeopardy. No civilized legal system places as-
certainment of guilt and conviction above all other considera-
tions. In the face of the enormous costs the possibility of a
second trial for the same offense inflicts on an individual, and
the slim chance that a second trial might result in a convic-
tion, the prosecutorial appeal ... hardly seems justified. 13
The ABA Task Force recommended that the Tribunal's stat-
ute be amended to permit only the convicted accused to appeal
a final judgement or seek review of a judgement. Under the
ABA Task Force recommendation, however, either party could
make an interlocutory appeal of a legal issue.214 Neither the Se-
curity Council nor the Tribunal implemented these recommen-
dations and the rules still permit prosecutorial appeal. Imple-
mentation of these recommendations would have aligned the
Tribunal with the practice of most modern legal systems, includ-
ing the military justice system.
A military accused is privileged to have several different and
independent levels of judicial review, depending upon the sen-
tence adjudged by the court-martial and approved by the con-
vening authority.2 15 Additionally, the accused has several differ-
213. Id. at 43.
214. Id.
215. After an accused is convicted and sentenced, a verbatim record of trial is pre-
pared and forwarded to the convening authority for review and action. R.C.M. 1103-06.
Before acting, the convening authority must consider the results of the trial, any written
matters submitted by the accused or his counsel, the staffjudge advocate's recommen-
dation concerning the sentence, and the defense counsel's response to that recommen-
dation. R.C.M. 1107(b)(3). The convening authority may then approve, modify, or
disapprove any finding of guilty; approve, disapprove, mitigate, or suspend all or part of
the sentence; or order a rehearing. R.C.M. 1107(c)-(e).
Thereafter, the appellate rights of an accused convicted by a general court-martial
are determined by the sentence adjudged and approved. General courts-martial that
include an approved sentence of confinement for one year or more, a bad conduct or
dishonorable discharge, or a dismissal are reviewed as follows:
If the accused does not waive appellate review after the convening authority acts,
the record of trial is then automatically forwarded to the cognizant Court of Criminal
Appeals under Article 66, UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); PRC.M. 1203.
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ent statutory remedies available beyond judicial review.2 16 The
prosecutor has no right to appeal a final judgement, although
he or she may make an interlocutory appeal on a matter of
law. 2
17
Another distinguishing feature of appellate practice in the
military justice system is the appointment of appellate defense
counsel to represent the accused without charge during these
If the accused is dissatisfied with the decision of that court, he may petition a civilian
court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ("USCAAF"). 10 U.S.C. § 867
(1988 & Supp. V 1993); R.C.M. 1204. This court is established under Article I of the
U.S. Constitution and is composed of five civilian jurists. 10 U.S.C. §§ 941-45 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); U.S. CONST art. I. The USCAAF is independent of the military and
operates as a "clear check on abuse." Gilligan & Wims, supra note 14, at 39. In limited
circumstances, the accused may petition the U.S. Supreme Court for further review of
his case under Article 67a, UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 867a (1988).
Other general courts-martial (those that do not include an approved sentence of
confinement for one year or more, a bad conduct or dishonorable discharge, or a dis-
missal) are reviewed as follows:
If the accused does not waive appellate review of his case, the record of trial is
forwarded for mandatory examination in the office of the cognizant JudgeAdvocate
General under Article 69(a), UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 869(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
cognizant Judge Advocate General may modify or set aside the findings of guilt, the
sentence, or both and may direct that the cognizant Court of Military Review to review
the case under Article 69(c), UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 869(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The accused is required to be advised of these appellate rights after being con-
victed by courts-martial. R.C.M. 1010. Normally, the accused is also provided with a
written explanation of these appellate rights.
216. Within two years from the date of the convening authority's action, the ac-
cused: (1) may petition the cognizant Judge Advocate General for a new trial under
Article 73, UCMJ, based on newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court; and (2)
may apply to the cognizant Judge Advocate General under Article 69(b), for relief
based on newly discovered evidence, fraud on the court, lack ofjurisdiction, error prej-
udicing his substantive rights, or inappropriateness of sentence. 10 U.S.C. §§ 873,
869(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). These "statutory" remedies are separate and distinct
from "appellate judicial review." Additionally, under Article 38(c), UCMJ, "[i]n any
court-martial proceeding resulting in conviction, the defense counsel... may forward
for attachment to the record of proceedings a brief of such matters as he determines
should be considered in behalf of the accused on review." 10 U.S.C. § 838(c) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993). Article 74, UCMJ, provides that the Secretary concerned may "remit or
suspend any part or amount of the unexecuted part of any sentence." 10 U.S.C. § 874
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
217. R.C.M. 908(a). Under this rule, the Government may not appeal "an order
or ruling that is, or amounts to, a finding of not guilty." Id. The Government may
appeal, however, an "order or ruling that terminates the proceedings with respect to a
charge or specification," or an "order which excludes evidence ... that is substantial
proof of a fact material in the proceedings." Id. Additionally, the Government may
appeal an order that is the "functional equivalent" of an order that terminates the pro-
ceedings. See United States v. True, 28 M.J. 1, 2 (C.M.A. 1989) (abatement order func-
tional equivalent of order terminating proceedings).
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appellate proceedings regardless of the accused's financial sta-
tus. The accused may also retain civilian appellate counsel at his
or her own expense."'8 The appellate defense counsel, whether
civilian or military, is typically a different attorney then the trial
defense counsel, which operates as a check on that counsel's ef-
fectiveness.219 The Tribunal appellate process does not provide
similar advantages to the accused.
E. Victim and Witness Protection
As noted above, the Security Council required the Tribunal
to provide for the protection of victims and witnesses in its rules,
including provision for in camera proceedings and the protection
of victims' identities.2 ' In meeting this obligation, the Tribunal
created a victims and witnesses unit to recommend protective
measures and provide counseling and support for victims and
witnesses;221 recognized the possibility of compensation to vic-
tims;2 and established various rules intended to protect victims
and witnesses.223
Most notable of these protective measures is Rule 75, Meas-
ures for the Protection of Victims and Witnesses. Rule 75 pro-
vides the following:
218. 10 U.S.C. § 870 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); R.C.M. 1202.
219. Gilligan & Wims, supra note 14, at 34; United States v. Dupas, 14 M.J. 28, 30
(C.MA 1982).
220. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing provisions for protection
of witnesses).
221. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 34, at 15.
222. Id. R. 106, at 41-42. This rule has been criticized for assuming "incorrectly in
many cases, that appropriate claims mechanisms exist at the national level and that
convicted persons will be able to satisfyjudgements for compensation, a promise on the
part of the international community that is likely to remain unfulfilled." Nsereko, supra
note 5, at 553-54.
223. See, e.g., I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 39, at 16-17 (permitting prosecutor to take
"special measures to provide for the safety of potential witnesses and informants"); id.
R. 40 (iii), at 17 (permitting prosecutor to request state "take all necessary measures to
prevent... injury to or intimidation of a victim or witness"); id. R. 65(B), at 27 (prohib-
iting provisional release of accused from pretrial detention if accused poses "a danger
to any victim, witness, or other person"); id. R. 69(A), at 29 (permitting prosecutor in
exceptional circumstances to seek order from trial chamber to conceal "identity of a
victim or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such person is brought under the
protection of the Tribunal"); id. R. 77, at 33 (providing for contempt charges against
anyone who attempts to intimidate witness); id. R. 79(ii), at 33-34 (providing for closed
trial sessions to ensure "nondisclosure of the identity of a victim or witness" whose iden-
tity Tribunal has ordered concealed); id. R. 105(A), at 41 (providing restitution of
property taken from victim by accused).
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(A) Ajudge or a Chamber may, proprio motu or at the request
of either party, or of the victim or witness concerned, order
appropriate measures for the privacy and protection of vic-
tims and witnesses, provided that the measures are consistent
with the rights of the accused.
(B) A Chamber may hold an ex parte proceeding to deter-
mine whether to order: (i) measures to prevent disclosure to
the public or the media of the identity or whereabouts of a
victim or a witness, or of persons related to or associated with
him [or her] ... ; (ii) closed sessions ... ; [or] (iii) appropri-
ate measures to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims
and witnesses, such as one-way closed circuit television.
(C) A Chamber shall, whenever necessary, control the man-
ner of questioning to avoid harassment or intimidation.
224
These measures represent a strong commitment to protect-
ing the safety, privacy, and dignity of victims and witnesses.
Although there are no analogous provisions within the military
justice system to compare, these provisions raise two concerns.
First, Rule 75 (B) (i) enumerates measures to prevent public
disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness. These measures
include expunging names and identifying information from
records; non-disclosure of any records identifying the victim; al-
tering the voice or image of a witness; using closed-circuit televi-
sion; and use of pseudonyms.2 25 This rule should be read to per-
mit such measures only to prevent disclosure of witness identity
to the public or the media, but not to prevent disclosure to the
accused.
Rule 69 creates some confusion, however, regarding this
contention. Under Rule 69(A), the prosecutor may seek an or-
der concealing the "identity of a victim or witness who may be in
danger until such person is brought under the protection of the
Tribunal."2 2 6 Rule 69(B) states, however, that "[s]ubject to Rule
75, the identity of the victim or witness shall be disclosed in suffi-
cient time prior to the trial to allow adequate time for prepara-
tion of the defence."22 7 Implicitly, Rule 75 thus permits non-dis-
closure of the identity of victims and witnesses to the defense
under certain circumstances. To avoid this implication, the Tri-
224. Id. R. 75, at 32.
225. Id. R. 75(B)(i), at 32.
226. Id. R. 69(B), at 29.
227. Id.
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bunal should amend both Rule 69 and 75 to make clear that
Rule 75(B) (i) does not apply to the defense. Most would agree
that applying the measures described to the defense would not
be "consistent with the rights of the accused," s2  particularly the
right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. If the rules are
not amended, they would appear to permit the prosecutor to
obtain an ex parte hearing to receive permission to call an un-
named, unidentified witness to testify against the accused by
closed circuit television from another location, and for the wit-
ness's image to be scrambled and voice distorted.
The second concern raised by these measures relates to the
apparently unbridled discretion of a trial chamber to order ap-
propriate measures for victim and witness protection 229 and to
control the manner of questioning whenever necessary.23 ° The
vagueness of the terms appropriate and necessary permit the
trial chamber judges unfettered discretion to direct virtually any
protective measure, for any reason. This presents a two-fold
problem: (1) the protective measures imposed may violate the
accused's right to confront and cross-examine the witness; and
(2) the protective measure imposed may appear to abandon the
presumption of innocence.3 1
The rules regarding protecting victims and witnesses should
strike a balance and be consistent with the accused's right to
confront and cross-examine the witness. Absent effective con-
frontation and cross-examination rights, witnesses could lie with
impunity without fear of their lies being revealed. A better rule,
one that is more consistent with the accused's rights and that
somewhat limits the judge's discretion, might be patterned after
228. Id. R. 75(A), at 32.
229. Id.
230. Id. R. 75(C), at 32.
231. Elaborate protective measures send the not-so-subtle message that the offense
occurred and the accused is the perpetrator. Otherwise, such measures would not be
necessary. In effect, this reverses the presumption of innocence. See Ralph H.
Kohlmann, The Presumption of Innocence: Patching the Tattered Cloak after Maryland v.
Craig, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. (forthcoming 1995). In a jury trial, this would present a diffi-
cult problem and an instruction to the jury to draw no adverse inference from the
protective measures would not adequately address this concern. In a trial before a
panel of distinguished jurists like the Tribunal, this is not such a difficulty because one
would presume thatjudges follow the law. Equally important as doing justice, however,
is that the Tribunal appear to do justice, especially given the precedential nature of this
undertaking. Elaborate protective measures may create the appearance to outside ob-
servers that the accused has already been tried and convicted.
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the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Maryland v. Craig,2 regard-
ing confrontation of child victims. Such a rule would require
face-to-face confrontation unless the prosecutor could make a
case specific showing of necessity based on impairment of the
victim's ability to communicate caused by the emotional distress
that would result from being forced to testify in the presence of
the accused. If such a case specific showing of necessity is made,
the Tribunal could permit the use of protective measures, such
as in camera proceedings, screens, closed circuit testimony, and
the accused's confrontation right would be protected by cross-
examination of the witness under oath and under the observa-
tion of the trial chamber and the accused.
F. Evidentiary Rules
As noted above, the Tribunal's statute contains no eviden-
tiary rules and, therefore, the Tribunal was charged with adopt-
ing such rules.113  Faced with this requirement, the Tribunal
adopted a simple set of rules stressing the admissibility of rele-
vant evidence. 3 4 Although this approach is consistent with the
approach taken at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials,2 3 it is in
marked contrast to the extensive evidentiary rules used in the
military justice system, which are virtually identical to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.236
Arguably, such extensive rules are unnecessary before a
body such as the Tribunal and would only complicate the pro-
cess. Many evidentiary rules are designed to keep untrustworthy
or inflammatory evidence from the fact-finder;23 7 and evidence
232. 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990).
233. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing responsibilities dele-
gated by Security Council to Tribunal).
234. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 89(C), at 36.
235. Compare id. R. 89(C), at 36 ("A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence
which it deems to have probative value.") with Nuremberg Charter, supra note 45, art.
19, 59 Stat. at 1551, 82 U.N.T.S. at 296 ("The Tribunal ... shall admit any evidence
which it deems to have probative value.").
236. FED. R. EVID. 101. "These rules govern proceedings in the courts of the
United States and before United States bankruptcyjudges and United States magistrate
judges, to the extent and with the exceptions [stated within these rules]." Id.
237. For example, most hearsay evidence is inadmissible because it is inherently
untrustworthy. Hearsay with a "sufficient indica of reliability" or "circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness," however, is admissible. Similarly, a proper foundation and
authentication of evidence is required prior to the admission of hearsay to guarantee its
trustworthiness.
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to which fact-finders, normally lay juries, may attach undue
weight. The Tribunal, however, is composed of respected jurists
capable of attaching the appropriate weight to evidence
presented and disregarding untrustworthy evidence. Instead of
a series of complex rules designed to filter untrustworthy or in-
flammatory evidence, a simple logical relevance standard would
suffice to determine admissibility of evidence.238
In large measure, the Tribunal took this approach. The
central principle of the evidentiary rules is the admissibility of
logically relevant evidence-if the evidence has probative value,
the evidence is admissible. 3 9 Under some circumstances, how-
ever, logically relevant evidence may be inadmissible if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by "the need to ensure a
fair trial. ' 24 0 In receiving evidence, a trial chamber "may request
verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out of
court."241  The rules permit a trial chamber to take judicial no-
tice of facts of common knowledge. 42 Regarding testimonial ev-
idence, the rules require live testimony unless a trial chamber
has previously ordered that the witnesses' testimony be taken by
238. Additional evidentiary rules concerning judicial notice, stipulations, privi-
leges, and other "judicial" issues would also be necessary. A "legal relevance" standard
like Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence would not be required because, for
example, unfair prejudice would not substantially outweigh the probative value of the
evidence because the Tribunal would be capable of attaching proper weight to the evi-
dence. FED. R. EVID. 403.
239. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 89(C), at 36.
240. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 89(D), at 36. This "legal relevance" standard is
somewhat more vague than the military standard, which provides that "[a] Ithough rele-
vant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the Uurors], or by consid-
erations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence." MIL. R. EVID. 403. See also FED. R. EVID. 403. The evils sought to be avoided by
this rule, however, relate to protecting a jury from evidence that might tend to "do
more harm than good." STEVEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MIUTARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MAN-
uAL 434 (3d ed. 1991). The question remains as to what types of relevant evidence will
the Tribunal exclude under this broad authority. One commentator suggests that the
Tribunal might properly exclude hearsay evidence and non-expert opinion testimony
under this rule. See Nsereko, supra note 5, at 542.
241. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 89(E), at 37.
242. Id. R. 94, at 38. Under military law, the judge may take judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact or of the law. MIL. R. EVID. 201 (b). "[A fact] must be one not subject
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known universally, locally, or in
the area pertinent to the event or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." MIL. R. EVID.
201 (A).
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deposition. 243 Witnesses testify under oath2 1 and are subject to
penalty for perjury.245
1. Pattern of Conduct
Although the Tribunal's evidentiary rules provide a basic
framework for receiving evidence, some of the remaining rules
raise more questions than they resolve. For example, the rules
indicate "[e]vidence of a consistent pattern of conduct may be
admissible in the interests ofjustice." 46 This rule could be read
to permit evidence of other bad acts to demonstrate that the ac-
cused had the propensity to engage in such conduct. The analo-
gous military rule prohibits such propensity evidence.247 To the
extent the interests of justice may permit such patterns of con-
duct to be introduced for other purposes, the Tribunal should
clarify the rule.
2. Confessions
Another area of concern relates to the evidentiary rule re-
garding confessions. This rule indicates that confessions are
"presumed to have been free and voluntary unless the contrary is
proved."2 48  Three problems are noted with this rule. First,
although the rule indicates the confession must be obtained in
strict compliance with the rule governing questioning the ac-
cused after his or her initial appearance,24 the rule does not
require strict compliance with the rule regarding the rights of
suspects during investigation.25 ° Second, the rule places the bur-
den of overcoming the presumption that the confession was free
243. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 90(A), at 37.
244. Id. R. 90(B), at 37.
245. Id. R. 91, at 37-38.
246. Id. R. 93, at 38.
247. See MIL. R. EVID. 404(b).
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the charac-
ter of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mis-
take or accident.
Id.
248. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 92, at 38.
249. Id. Rule 92 refers to Rule 63. Id. Rule 63 provides that the accused's counsel
must be present for any questioning of the accused after his or her initial appearance
and that the accused be warned regarding the right to remain silent. Id. R. 63, at 26.
250. Id. R. 42, at 18. See also supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (discussing
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and voluntary on the accused. Finally, the rule fails to establish a
standard by which the accused overcomes the presumption.
The military evidentiary rule regarding confessions and ad-
missions, meanwhile, provides a detailed framework for deter-
mining admissibility that avoids these problems. 5 ' Under this
rule, involuntary statements are not admissible against an ac-
cused who has moved for its suppression or objected to the ad-
missibility of the statement.252 An involuntary statement is any
statement taken "in violation of the self-incrimination privilege
or due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, Article 31, or through the use of coer-
cion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. "253 As noted
above, Article 31 applies to the questioning of a suspect.
254
Thus, questioning in violation of a suspect's rights is included
within the military rule. Moreover, once the accused objects to
the admissibility of a confession or admission, the prosecutor has
the burden of establishing the statement was voluntary by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 55
3. Evidence in Cases of Sexual Assault
Assuming rape and other sexual assault crimes are punish-
able before the Tribunal, 56 three issues are presented by the
situations in which Tribunal rules requiring warnings of right to remain silent may be
circumvented).
251. See generally MIL. R. EVID. 304.
252. MIL. R. EVID. 304(a).
253. MIL. R. EVID. 304(c) (3). See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Article 31 and its relationship to Fifth Amendment).
254. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing Article 31 as more pro-
tective of individuals' right to remain silent than civilian provisions).
255. MIL. R. EVID. 304(e)(1).
256. The "evidentiary" rule regarding evidence in cases of sexual assault presents a
preliminary issue concerning the conditions under which rape and other crimes of sex-
ual violence constitute "serious violation of international humanitarian law" within the
Tribunal's jurisdiction. Although the answer to this question is beyond the scope of this
Article, the following paragraphs provide a brief discussion. For a more detailed discus-
sion, see C.P.M. Cleiren & M.E.M. Tijssen, Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Assault in the
Armed Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Legal, Procedural, and Evidentiay Issues, 5 GRIM.
L.F. 471 (1994); MacKinnon, supra note 3; Rape as a Crime, supra note 3; War Crimes
Trials, supra note 18; Tompkins, supra note 3.
Rapes committed within the context of a "widespread or systematic" attack against
a civilian population on "national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds" consti-
tute crimes against humanity as that term is understood. Report On Establishing the Tribu-
nal, supra note 2, at 13, 1 48. Proof of systematic governmental planning and action,
however, is generally considered a necessary element of crimes against humanity. War
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Crimes Trials, supra note 18, at 130. See also Rape as a Crime, supra-note 3, at 428. Acquir-
ing evidence of such planning or action may be difficult and present an obstacle to
effective prosecution.
Similar difficulties arise in charging. widespread or systematic rape as genocide.
Under the Genocide Convention, certain acts committed with "intent to destroy... a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group" constitutes genocide. Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, art. II, 78 U.N.T.S.
277, 1970 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 58 (Cmnd. 4421) at 4; Tribunal Statute, supra note 2, art. 4,
2, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 37-38, 32 I.L.M. 1193. These acts include: "(b) causing seri-
ous bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions calculated to bring about its destruction [and] (d) imposing meas-
ures intended to prevent births within the group." Id. The difficulty in such cases
would be establishing the specific intent requirement.
Given these proof problems, the only remaining options are to prosecute rape as a
"lesser" offense of "violation of the laws or customs of war" or as a "grave breach" of the
Geneva Conventions. War Crimes Law, supra note 3, at 84 ("The possibility of prosecut-
ing the far more frequent cases of rape that are regarded as 'lesser' war crimes or grave
breaches should not be neglected."). This may be more problematic, however, given
the "conventional" meaning of "violations of the laws or customs of war" and "grave
breaches."
"Violations of the laws or customs of war" are crimes against the conventional or
customary law committed by persons on one side of a conflict against persons or prop-
erty of the other side. Rape as a Crime, supra note 3, at 426. Generally, these "war
crimes" prohibit certain means and methods of warfare such as use of poisonous weap-
ons, wanton destruction of cities not justified by military necessity, and attack or bom-
bardment of undefended towns. Tribunal Statute, supra note 2, art. 3, U.N. Doc. S/
25704, at 37, 32 I.L.M. at 1192. Rape would not appear to fall within this definition.
Even if rape is considered within the conventional or customary definition of "war
crimes," rape of a citizen of your own nationality may not. Rape as a Crime, supra note 3,
at 427 n.19.
Regarding grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, grave breaches are serious
acts committed against an individual protected by the Geneva Conventions including
willful killing, torture, inhuman treatment, and wilfully causing great suffering to body
or health. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War (Geneva Convention IV), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 1958 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 39 (Cmnd. 550) at 296. At a minimum, rape should.be considered by the
Tribunal to fall under inhuman treatment or willfully causing great suffering to body or
health; and, under some circumstances, it may rise to the level of torture. Rape as a
Crime, supra note 3, at 426.
The difficulty, however, is that the offense is only a grave breach if committed
against a "protected person." Generally, the Geneva Conventions only protect
wounded and sick combatants, medical and religious personnel, shipwrecked combat-
ants, prisoners of war, and civilians in occupied territory who are not of the same na-
tionality as protected persons. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Con-
dition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva Convention
I), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 13 (wounded and sick combatants), arts. 24, 26 (medical and
religious personnel) TIAS No. 3362, at 20, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva Convention II), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, TIAS No. 3363, at 6,
75 U.N.T.S. 75 (shipwrecked combatants); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III), Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, TIAS No.
3364, at 6,.75 U.N.T.S. 135 (prisoners of war); Geneva Convention Relative to the Pro-
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rule concerning evidence in cases of sexual assault:25 7 the ab-
sence of a corroboration requirement, the issue of consent, and
the rape shield provision.
First, the rule provides that "no corroboration of the vic-
tim's testimony shall be required" in sexual assault cases. 258 His-
torically, such a corroboration requirement in rape cases was
common, although it was not a common law requirement. 2 9
There are three justifications typically advanced for the corrobo-
ration requirement. The first justification is based on a fear of
false rape charges. 260 The corroboration requirement would, in
theory, prevent such frivolous claims. The second justification is
based on the highly charged emotional nature of rape allega-
tions and the fear that the judge and jury might be so enraged by
the allegation that they would convict without adequate evi-
dence.261 Thus, the corroboration requirement was thought to
protect the accused from an unfair conviction. The final justifi-
cation is based on the difficulty in defending against an accusa-
tion of rape.262 Without corroboration, only the conflicting testi-
tection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV), Aug. 12, 1949, art.
4, 1, TIAS No. 3365, at 6, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (civilians in occupied territory). If the rape
victim is not a "protected person," then the rape would not be considered a "grave
breach."
Thus, in some circumstances, absent evidence of a "widespread or systematic at-
tack" required of crimes against humanity or the specific intent required of genocide,
certain rapes do not appear to fall within the definitions described above. A Bosnian
national raping another Bosnian national, for example, would not constitute rape
under the above definitions.
It may be time for the international community to reconcile this aberration either
by treaty or validation of the evolution of customary law by successful prosecution
before the Tribunal. International law is evolving, and "customary" international law
may evolve beyond "treaty" or "convention" definitions. In this regard, the Tribunal
may enforce "customary" law not yet reflected in "treaty" law. In doing so, the Tribunal
would validate the customary law, much like the Nuremberg trials validated crimes
against humanity as -a violation of international humanitarian law. Until validated by
successful prosecutions, however, such evolution remains merely speculative. Also, the
question could arise regarding which came first - much like the proverbial chicken or
egg - the customary law that was then validated by the Tribunal, or the Tribunal "vali-
dation" of nonexistent law.
257. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 96, at 38-39. There is no analogous rule in the
military justice system.
258. Id. R. 96(i), at 38.
259. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1137 n.155 (1986).
260. Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal not Reform, 81 YALE LJ. 1365,
1373 (1972).
261. Id. at 1378.
262. Id. at 1382. See, e.g., 1 MA-rHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 686 (1680)
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mony of the victim and the accused remain.
Although "few jurisdictions have abolished this practice,
and many more still insist on it,"2 6 3 the modern trend has been
toward abolishing the corroboration requirement. In U.S.
courts, twenty-two states have decreed that corroboration of a
victim's testimony is not required when the testimony is credible,
clear, and convincing, or sufficient to prove the elements of rape
beyond a reasonable doubt.264 Seven states have eliminated the
requirement by statute.263
That the Tribunal has followed this modern trend is not sur-
prising given that the justifications typically advanced to support
such a requirement are not relevant to proceedings before a
body such as the Tribunal. First, although possible, false claims
are not as likely within the context of war crimes as in other con-
texts. Second, the Tribunal is unlikely to be so enraged by an
allegation that it is unable to appropriately weigh the evidence
and hold the prosecution to its burden of proof. Finally,
although the absence of a corroboration requirement makes it
(Rape "is an accusation easily made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended
by the party accused, tho never so innocent."). The Model Penal Code ("MPC") re-
tained the corroboration requirement in its 1980 revision based on the perceived diffi-
culty in defending against the claim of rape. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6, at 428 (Offi-
cial Draft and Revised Commentaries 1980). The MPC drafters claim that the corrobo-
ration requirement is not an attempt to discount female testimony, but is "only a
particular implementation of the general policy that uncertainty should be resolved in
favor of the accused." Id. at 429. See also Estrich, supra note 259, at 1138.
263. Nsereko, supra note 5, at 548.
264. See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rule Regarding Ne-
cessity for Corroboration of Victim's Testimony in Prosecution for Sexual Offense, 31 A.L.R. 4TH
120 (1994 Supp.) (Lockett v. State, 518 So.2d 877 (Ala. 1987); Roper v. State, 756
S.W.2d 124 (Ark. 1988); People v. Poggi, 753 P.2d 1082 (Cal. 1988); Mitchell v. State,
335 S.E.2d 150 (Ga. 1985); People v. Brown, 461 N.E.2d 71 (Ill. 1984); Fields v. State,
455 N.E.2d 601 (Ind. 1983); State v. Lile, 699 P.2d 456 (Kan. 1985); State v. Montana,
533 So.2d 983 (La. 1988); State v. Philbrick, 551 A.2d 847 (Me. 1988); State v. DeBaere,
356 N.W.2d 301 (Minn. 1981); Christian v. State, 456 So.2d 729 (Miss. 1984); State v.
Van Doren, 657 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. 1983); State v. Medina, 798 P.2d 1032 (Mont. 1990);
State v. Hunter, 677 P.2d 618 (N.M. 1984); People v. Mattison, 97 A.D.2d 621, 468
N.Y.S.2d 932 (3d Dep't 1983); State v. Oasheim, 353 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1984); State v.
Love, 550 N.E.2d 951 (Ohio 1988); Binder v. State, 713 P.2d 1134 (Okla. 1986); Com-
monwealth v. Ritchie, 472 A.2d 220 (Pa. 1984); Grogan v. State, 713 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.
1986); Barker v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E. 2d 729 (Va. 1985); State v. Gilbert, 339 S.E.2d
851 (W.Va. 1990); Story v. State, 721 P.2d 1020 (Wyo. 1986)).
265. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.022 (West 1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-15 (Michie
1994); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-11 (1993); S.C. CODE RGs. § 16-3-657 (Law. Co-op 1993);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit., § 3255(a) (2) (Supp. 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A-44-020(1)
(West 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-311 (Supp. 1994).
U.N. JUSTICE OR MILITARY JUSTICE
somewhat more difficult to defend a rape allegation and eases
the prosecution's burden of production, it does not diminish its
burden of proof. The prosecutor must still convince the trial
chamber of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
may often require the prosecutor to introduce corroborating evi-
dence.
The second issue related to the Tribunal rule concerning
evidence in sexual assault cases involves the issue of consent.2 66
Originally, the rule merely provided that " [c] onsent shall not be
allowed as a defence" in sexual assault cases. Subsequently, the
Tribunal amended the rule to provide that consent is not a de-
fense "if the victim (a) has been subjected to or threatened with
or has had reason to fear violence, duress, detention, or psycho-
logical oppression; or (b) reasonably believed that if the victim
did not submit, another might be subjected to, threatened or
put in fear."26 7
This rule may be criticized in that the rule is substantive and
not evidentiary or procedural. The Security Council only au-
thorized the Tribunal to adopt rules of procedure and evi-
dence.2 68 Any attempt by the Tribunal to define substantive
criminal offenses is beyond the scope of authority granted them
by the Security Council. Arguably, this is exactly what the Tribu-
nal did regarding sexual assaults. Most would regard the ab-
266. Admittedly, this discussion is largely academic given the nature of the allega-
tions arising in the former Yugoslavia. According to the Commission of Experts, rape
and sexual assault allegations fall into five different patterns:
The first pattern involves individuals or small groups committing sexual
assault in conjunction with looting and intimidation of the target ethnic
group....
The second pattern of rape involves individuals or small groups commit-
ting sexual assaults in conjunction with fighting in an area, often including the
rape of women in public....
The third pattern of rape involves individuals or groups sexually assault-
ing people in detention because they have access to the people....
The fourth pattern of rape involves individuals or groups committing sex-
ual assaults against women for the purpose of terrorizing and humiliating
them often as part of the policy of "ethnic cleansing". ...
The fifth pattern of rape involves detention of women in hotels or similar
facilities for the sole purpose of sexually entertaining soldiers, rather than
causing a reaction in the women.
Final Report, supra note 18, 245-49. Consent would not likely be an issue in cases
arising in the context of any of these "patterns."
267. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 96(ii), at 38.
268. Report On Establishing the Tribunal, supra note 2, at 21, 84; Tribunal Statute,
supra note 2, art. 15, U.N. Doc. S/25704, at 42, 32 I.L.M. at 1196.
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sence of consent to be an element of the offense or the presence
of consent to be an affirmative defense. 69 In either case, the
issue of consent is part of the substantive definition of the crime.
Besides being beyond the scope of the authority of the Tri-
bunal, the question arises whether this substantive provision re-
flects "those provisions of international law that are clear and
generally accepted." 271 It is tempting to try drafting substantive
definitions of the specific offenses within the general categories
of crimes within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Such definitions ap-
pear necessary when the burden of proof is on the prosecutor to
prove the accused's guilt under a standard of proof. Without
definitions or elements, the prosecutor may have difficulty deter-
mining what is to be proven, and the judges may be incapable of
determining whether the prosecutor has met the burden of
proof.
This temptation, however, should be avoided. Either the
crime is part of international customary law and capable of de-
termination or it is not. Attempting a restatement of interna-
tional' customary law risks creating new law.271 The Tribunal
should apply only those provisions of international law that are
clear and generally accepted. Any attempts by the Tribunal to
venture into substantive criminal definitions should be subjected
to extensive scrutiny to ensure the definition reflects accepted
norms of international, conventional, or customary law.
269. For two thought-provoking articles concerning the relationship of consent to
allegations of rape and sexual assaults see Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on
the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1780
(1992) (arguing for reclassification of sexual assaults into two categories: (1) sexual
assaults (forcible acts); and (2) sexual expropriation (non-consensual acts)); Cynthia
Ann Wicktom, Note, Focusing on the Offender's Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefini-
tion of Rape Laws, 56 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 399 (1988) (arguing that definitions of sexual
assault crimes focus on force, but that consent remain as affirmative defense).
270. War Crimes Trials, supra note 18, at 128. See also supra notes 30-38 (discussing
Tribunal's application of existing international humanitarian law, and Tribunal's inabil-
ity to create new law). Although this question is posed here, its answer is beyond the
scope of this Article.
271. Arguably, this is what the Tribunal accomplished with the original version of
Rule 96. In the original version, the rule provided that "consent shall not be allowed as
a defence." U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 484, 536. The question could then be
asked that if consent is not a defense and, implicitly, the absence of consent is not an
element of the crime, what constitutes the crime of rape? Perhaps to resolve this ques-
tion, the Tribunal amended the rule to, in effect, state that consent is not a defense if
the consent was non-consensual. See supra notes 266-267 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing circumstances in which consent would not be allowed as defense).
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The final issue related to the rule concerning evidence in
sexual assault cases involves the rape shield provision which ex-
cludes all evidence concerning the prior sexual history of the
victim. 27 2 Arguably, this rule is overly broad. It excludes not
only prior consensual acts of the victim with others, but prior
consensual acts of the victim with the accused and prior non-
consensual acts of others.
Most commentators would agree that prior consensual acts
of the victim with others have no probative value and should be
properly inadmissable 73 Prior consensual acts of the victim
with the accused and prior non-consensual acts of others, how-
ever, may have probative value. The military rules of evidence
recognize this possibility by permitting evidence of past sexual
behavior of the victim with the accused offered to show that the
victim consented 274 and evidence of past acts of others offered to
show the accused was not the source of semen or injury.275
Taken alone, the rules regarding evidence in sexual assault
cases and the measures to protect victims and witnesses might
seem appropriate. Taken together, however, the rules deny the
accused the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against him and to present a defense. The Tribunal should
amend the rules by eliminating the unnecessary and confusing
provision regarding consent and narrow the rape shield provi-
sion to permit legitimate cross-examination while protecting le-
gitimate privacy interests of victims.
CONCLUSION
The creation of an ad hoc international tribunal and adop-
tion of rules of procedure and evidence for such a tribunal are
steps in an evolutionary process. As with any evolutionary pro-
cess, there is opportunity for erosion as well as progress. The
failure of this first attempt by the United Nations to act against
war criminals would erode the rule of international law. Instead
272. I.T.R.P.E., supra note 4, R. 96(iv), at 39. Article 96(iv) excludes all evidence
concerning "the prior sexual conduct of the victim." Id.
273. See Sakthi Murthy, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using
Rape Vitim's Sexual History to Show the Defendants Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 Cal. L. Rev.
541, 542, n.6 (1991) (stating consensual sexual acts with others have no probative
value).
274. Mil. R. Evid. 412(b) (2) (B).
275. Id. 412(b)(2)(A).
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of the rule of law, trial and punishment would again be linked to
total victory and "victor's justice."
Equally important, however, is whether the international
community views the trials as fundamentally fair. The legitimacy
of the Tribunal turns not only on whether the Security Council
had the authority to establish such a Tribunal, but whether, once
established, the Tribunal observes basic norms of due process.
States will only willingly cede a portion of their sovereignty to
such international undertakings if they comport with fundamen-
tal notions of due process and fairness.
As noted above, the Tribunal's statute advanced three laud-
able general principles: a commitment to prosecuting only
those crimes that are beyond doubt part of customary interna-
tional law; a commitment to ensuring the accused receives a fair
trial with certain fundamental rights guaranteed; and a commit-
ment to protecting victims and witnesses. 76 The rules of proce-
dure and evidence adopted by the Tribunal reflect these same
principles. These principles conflict, however, where the Tribu-
nal fails to adequately protect the rights of individual accused in
favor of protecting victims and witnesses. The Tribunal should
reevaluate its rules to ensure these general principles are prop-
erly balanced.
Comparison of the Tribunal rules with the analogous provi-
sion of military law reveals numerous ways in which the military
justice system is more protective of individual rights. The Tribu-
nal should consider these comparisons and, where appropriate,
amend their rules to provide similar protections. Moreover, the
international community should seriously consider the model
provided by the military justice system in future attempts to pun-
ish violations of international humanitarian law. If the Tribunal
does not adequately protect individual rights, or properly bal-
ance those rights against other concerns such as the protection
of victims and witnesses, the Tribunal will erode, instead of ad-
vance, the rule of international law.
276. See supra notes 30-55 and accompanying text (discussing general principles
advanced by Tribunal).
